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 Despite the potential benefits that improving executive function and working memory 
might have for performance at school and work, the use of cognitive training as a means to 
augment these capacities remains controversial. There is consensus that training leads to 
improvements on the tasks themselves, as well as limited near-transfer. However, there is little 
agreement regarding whether meaningful far transfer can be demonstrated. In the present work I 
consider the causes of these varied outcomes, first through a historical perspective, and then 
through a focus on the influence of individual-difference factors on the outcome of cognitive 
training. One particular factor that is known to influence the outcome of other interventions, 
motivation, has not been well-studied in the context of cognitive training. In three studies I 
examine the influence of motivation, broadly defined, on the outcome of training interventions. 
Study 1 explores how children might respond to different versions of a cognitive training 
program that include certain game-like features that are thought to be motivational. Contrary to 
my expectations, I found that children performed better on the versions of the training that did 
not include certain common “engagement” features. I interpret this finding as evidence that 
features that distract from the core task might actually reduce performance early in training. 
Study 2 examines the influence of extrinsic monetary reward on the outcome of a training 
program in young adults. Again, contrary to my expectations, I found that payment did not have 
in undermining effect on training or transfer performance, although it may have been responsible 




motivation and baseline cognitive performance, on the outcome of a transcranial direct current 
stimulation (tDCS) augmented working memory training program in adults. I found that both 
baseline performance and motivation influenced the outcome of the intervention, but only among 
participants who did not receive active stimulation. From these studies I conclude that motivation 
may have a nuanced and multifaceted influence on the outcome of training interventions. Finally, 
I briefly discuss the implications of these findings and what might be done to improve future 







The Origins of the “American Question” 
 
 
Hall: Now that we’ve mentioned an American educator, may I ask what you have called “the 
American question”? Is it possible to speed up the learning of conservation concepts? 
Piaget: In turn may I ask the counter-question? Is it a good thing to accelerate the learning of 
these concepts? 
 






 It is often recounted that, when renowned Swiss psychologist Jean Piaget was asked 
whether it was possible to accelerate the acquisition of concepts such as conservation of number 
or volume beyond the typical course of development, he referred to the query as the “American 
question.” This response was so common that journalist Elizabeth Hall, who developed a 
considerable reputation for her interviews of prominent psychologists, made it a point to ask it of 
Piaget in her 1970 interview for Psychology Today (Hall, 1970). Piaget’s response was his 
typical one – that he saw no reason to accelerate what was dictated by nature and already 
optimal.  
 And yet, a brief internet search suggests that few have taken Piaget’s response to heart. 
Advertisements for applications and programs developed by the nascent “brain training industry” 
abound. Lumosity, Elevate, and Peak, for example, are listed on a popular technology website as 
“three brain training apps that really work” (Harper, 2016). While the development and sale of 
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games designed to improve cognitive function has only recently become a billion-dollar 
industry1, these programs are anything but new. For example: the issue of Psychology Today 
immediately before the one that featured the interview with Piaget included an advertisement for 
a logic game called WFF N’Proof. Just a few years earlier, WFF N’Proof itself was studied as a 
means of improving performance on the California Test of Mental Maturity (Allen, Allen, & 
Miller, 1966). It was only one of many historical training interventions essentially designed to 
answer the “American question.” In fact, the list of studies that examine the effects of experience 
on cognitive performance is so vast that it defies inclusion in any single review, meta-analysis, 
book, or dissertation. Here I focus on a single thread of this research: cognitive training. The 
remainder of the present chapter will serve to define the topic and provide historical perspective 
on why it has long been a compelling means of attempting to answer Piaget’s “American 
question.” 
 
What is Cognitive Training? 
 
Cognitive training (or “brain training,” or “mind training”) refers to activities designed to 
make people “smarter” and thus better at reasoning, problem solving, and learning. Many current 
cognitive training programs target basic cognitive skills such as attention (the ability to 
selectively attend to relevant information), working memory (the ability to actively keep in mind 
task-relevant thoughts), or executive functions (the set of processes involved in controlling and 
regulating thought and action). The focus on these processes arises from the fact that there are 
very real limits on their capacity and that individuals differ in terms of these limits (Daneman & 
Carpenter, 1980), that they are necessary for complex, intelligent behavior (Carpenter, Just, & 
                                                          
1 The “billion dollar” number is often cited from a single industry report from sharpbrains.com, however, the 
combined sales of all major brain training companies never reached this number during my time in the industry.  
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Shell, 1990), and that they are highly correlated with individual differences in intelligence, 
academic achievement, and life outcomes (Engle, Kane, & Tuholski, 1999; Clair-Thompson & 
Gathercole, 2006).  In recent years, many cognitive training programs have utilized tasks that 
were originally created to help understand these processes (e.g. Jaeggi et al., 2008; Rueda et al., 
2005). Given their importance, it is not surprising that researchers have long been interested in 
their potential for malleability (Kay, 1888). Alhough questions of how these processes operate 
are not fully resolved (see for example Miyake & Shah, 1999) researchers know that the 
prefrontal cortex is the primary brain region associated with them (Braver et al., 1997; Nee, 
Jonides, & Berman 2007).  
Historically, similar, but non-computerized, tasks were used in attempts to enhance 
attention and memory (Feuerstein & Jensen, 1980). Other interventions embed these basic 
processes in other activities, such as play (e.g., Tools of the Mind, Diamond et al., 2007). More 
complex activities that are thought to transfer to skills like reasoning are sometimes incorporated 
into cognitive training as well (e.g., problem solving). In addition to activities developed 
specifically to enhance cognition, sometimes off-the-shelf activities (e.g., video games, board 
games, dance, music) are used for the purpose of improving reasoning and problem solving 
(Diamond, 2012; Mackey et al., 2011).  
It is known that practice on the activities described above leads to improved performance 
on those same activities, but to what extent do those improvements matter for other, untrained 
tasks? For some things, it is assumed that practice does transfer to other situations. A basketball 
player who lifts weights or practices sprinting does so not to improve those basic skills, but to 
become a better basketball player (these athletic examples are also apt because of the too-
frequent assumption that fade out effects mean that training programs have failed, while it may 
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simply be that, as with physical exercise, continued practice is necessary to reap the benefits). 
The degree that practice-based improvements transfer to other cognitive tasks is, however, a 
matter of controversy (and has been for some time; see Thomson, 2006; Yellowlees, 1940). 
Cognitive skill improvements are relevant for a wide range of populations, from older adults 
whose cognitive capacities might be in decline to fighter pilots who need to perform at peak 
capacity. Additionally, children who have ADHD, experiences of early stress due to poverty, 
nutrition deficits, and so forth all might benefit from cognitive interventions. In fact, cognitive 
training is potentially relevant for everyone, even those whose abilities are within the normal 
range.  Thus it is not surprising that so many people are interested in mind training, and have 
been for many years. And yet there is often little discussion in present research of the origins of 
this interest – and furthermore, of the early attempts to study such programs empirically.  
 
A Problem of Semantics? 
 
A key challenge in identifying early cognitive training interventions and research lies in 
the shifting language used to describe “cognitive performance.” Terms like attention, 
concentration, reasoning, and memory have long histories within the English language but have 
generally retained consistent meaning within the vernacular, whereas terms such as 
“intelligence” have changed dramatically following certain key events (in this case, the 
development of psychometric testing at the turn of the 20th century). Other popular terms, such as 
“executive function,” have only surfaced much more recently (Baddeley, 1979). Given the 
popularity of keyword searches in determining what papers to include in reviews and meta-
analyses, the issue of terminology may heavily limit the inclusion of historical work in 
discussions of cognitive training.  
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For example, there is a large body of research detailing the relationship of experience on 
intelligence per se. While this historical body of work goes largely unmentioned in contemporary 
reviews (Simons et al., 2016 being the notable exception), the work that is mentioned is 
nevertheless limited to articles that explicitly use the term intelligence. For example, one can 
follow the track of intelligence-focused intervention research in scholarly pieces from the 1928 
Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education (Whipple, 1928) to the 1940 
Yearbook of the same society (Whipple, 1940) to J.M. Hunt’s landmark Intelligence and 
Experience (1961) to Whimbey’s Intelligence Can Be Taught (1975) to Detterman & Sternberg’s 
How and How Much Can Intelligence Be Increased (1982) to Spitz’s The Raising of Intelligence 
(1986) to Martinez’s Education as the Cultivation of Intelligence (2000) to Jausovec’s 
Increasing Intelligence (2017), which was published this very year and discusses Study 1 of this 
dissertation. Each of the above pieces are extremely comprehensive and include detailed 
discussion of most of the major studies that came before it. Some, like Detterman & Sternberg’s 
book, do an admirable job of collecting almost every major study designed to improve 
intelligence. 
And yet, because these works focus on intelligence per se, they leave out a variety of 
interventions and scholarly work aimed at related constructs such as attention or reasoning. For 
example, despite having his work promoted by William James (James, 1890), very few 
contemporary researchers are aware of David P. Kay’s work (1888), and when they do mention 
him, it is largely in the context of improving long term memory (Collins, 2014). While this is 
understandable given that his book is titled Memory and How to Improve It, Kay understood and 
defined mental processes in ways that would not seem out of place in modern discussions of 
executive function. For example, Kay writes of a “second type of memory” that he refers to as 
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the “rational” form. “It is of the utmost importance to us, in forming our judgement of things or 
in determining upon a particular line of conduct, to be able to bring together before the mind a 
number of instances of the same or a like kind, recent or long past, which may aid us in coming 
to a right determination” (Kay, 20). This description fits well with modern definitions of working 
memory. Kay also described attention and inhibitory control, and what might be done to improve 
them. However, Kay’s book rarely mentions intelligence, and thus it is perhaps unsurprising that 
it has been left out of historical reviews of interventions to improve cognition. That this 
distinction often comes down to semantics has not entirely been lost on researchers interested in 
interventions designed to improve cognitive function. For example, in Brown and Campione’s 
chapter within How and How Much Can Intelligence Be Increased, they argue that most of the 
interventions detailed earlier in the book are focused more on cognitive skills rather than 
intelligence more broadly (Brown & Campione, 1982). And while they make a compelling case 
that this is indeed true, they do not consider whether studies that explicitly focus on cognitive 
skills, and their historical antecedents, might have been left out from their discussions. Thus, in 
the present chapter, I try to focus on interventions that fit the general definition of cognitive 
training described above, rather than studies specifically targeted at improving a particular 
construct, whether that be working memory, reasoning, or intelligence. 
 
Historical Interventions in the Public Eye 
 
Of course, part of the reason that modern researchers see David Kay as a memory 
researcher is that many of his contemporaries were indeed focused on improving long term 
memory. Why do most contemporary cognitive training interventions focus on improving 
cognitive skills, rather than memory per se? Sources from antiquity, reaching as far back as the 
Dhammapada in the 3rd century B.C.E. (Buddhaghosa, 1996), suggest that humans have long 
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recognized that being able to attend to the world and inhibit distractions are key in a successful 
mental life and that these capacities may be improved through practice. However, prior to the 
industrial revolution many documented mental training activities in the West, such as the 
mnemonics of Simonides and Saint Thomas Aquinas, focused on long-term memory (Patten, 
1990), although Plato was cognizant of the idea that training in arithmetic could impact general 
mental quickness (Grube, 1992).  
Scholarly textual references to improving constructs psychologists would now consider 
“cognitive skills” – such as concentration, attention, and inhibition – generally remain rare until 
the second half of the 19th century. While there are likely a variety of causes for this, a review of 
early training programs and early interventions suggests a convergence of three specific factors.  
First, by the 1880s in America and Europe, compulsory education was generally accepted as a 
public good. A renewed focus on educational pedagogy for the masses cultivated new interest in 
techniques to help a wider variety of students prepare for the workforce. The resurgence of 
popularity of Herbart in the mid-1800s is a primary example of this (De Garmo, 1895; Boring, 
1950). Second, by the final decades of the 19th century, the disciplines of psychology and 
neuroscience were formalized, both within the minds of the educated public and the academy. 
Work by William James helped to embed constructs such as attention as a topic of study; the 
early psychometric work of Francis Galton helped to operationalize intellect as something that 
could be explicitly measured (and thus raising the question of whether those measurements 
might change over time) (Hergenhahn & Henley, 2013). Finally, by the late 1800s there was a 
greater public interest in skills that would now be described as related to learning to learn rather 
than on memorization per se. For example, terms related to the non-memory cognitive processes 
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necessary for learning and working, such as concentration, saw considerably greater mention in 





Figure 1.1. Ngram of mentions of “concentration” vs “memory”, late 19th to early 20th century  
 
 
 At first this meant that mnemonic programs were discarded in favor of other strategy-
based systems for memorization (Collins, 2014). The popular memory improvement programs, 
such as Dr. Edward Pick’s popular On Memory and the Rational Means of Improving It, 
included language that generally depicts improving memory itself as a means to an end (Pick, 
1860). Pick describes memory as “the foundation of intellectual life.” However, similar 
programs of the late 1800s (including that of the pseudonymous “Alphonse Loisette,” who 
infamously copied Pick’s approach in his own wildly successful program) included marketing 
language more closely focused on improving “attention” rather than memory alone (Loisette, 
1896). Loisette (actually Marcus Dwight Larrowe) operated his own memory improvement clinic 
at 237 5th Avenue in New York, and counted Mark Twain among his clients. While memory was 
certainly a focus of Loisette’s program, his marketing took a different tack. He wrote that in 
addition to making “surer remembers” his system “does and must make better observers, clearer 
and more consecutive thinkers, and sounder reasoners” (Loisette, 1896).  
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The many spiritualist movements in the United States, and a Victorian area focus on 
health improvement, including the health of the mind, also brought “mind-training” to the 
forefront of the public sphere. Pamphlets for programs of this time, such as the Ralston Brain 
Regime, “designed to develop perfect health in the physical brain, strengthen the mind, and 
increase the power of thought” may have literally been sold alongside snake oil supplements 
(Ralston, 1891). Another program, Pelmanism, brought “mind-training” to popular 
consciousness across Great Britain and later much of the world (suggesting that the possibility 
that cognition might be improved has never been a uniquely American question). It combined 
self-help invectives with the completion of repeated cognitive tasks; among the activities it 
included was the card game Concentration and the chess-based knight’s journey. Pelmanism was 
probably the first example of widely-available commercial brain training and at its peak counted 
over 500,000 customers worldwide (Katz, 2016; Thomson, 2006). By World War II, however, 
the scientific community firmly saw Pelmanism as lumped in with “autosuggestion… unfired 
food, dietetic and psychological magic” (Yellowlees, 1940) and other offerings in which 
“prestige and profits are acquired by dubious interventions in the lives of others” (Sullivan, 
1942). 
 
The Example of Catherine Aiken 
 
While the “Pelman Institute” was printing its first little grey books in the 1890s, 
Catherine Aiken, a Quaker schoolteacher in Stamford, Connecticut, developed a system of 
attention training for the girls in her school at least a decade earlier. Like many cognitive 
interventions of today, it required pupils to spend about 15 minutes a day on short attention and 
memory activities. In 1894, Charles Warner described her system in Harper’s (Warner, 1894). In 
one activity, “a collection of figures was placed upon the reverse side of a revolving blackboard, 
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then quickly turned; the figures were instantly recognized in their order” (i.e., a working memory 
task). To make the task more difficult, some exercises required students not only to memorize 
numbers but also to apply various arithmetic operations to them.  Her program also included 
subitizing practice long before Kaufman coined the term; the Harper’s account describes it as 
follows “Another exercise which developed quick perception is that of ‘unconscious counting,’ 
or of immediately recognizing the number of a group of objects without counting them” 
(Warner, 1894). Following the release of the Harper’s article, Aiken published two books, 
Methods of Mind-Training: Concentrated Attention and Memory and Exercises in Mind-Training 
In Quickness of Perception, Concentrated Attention, and Memory (Aiken 1895; Aiken, 1899). 
These books describe her program in detail and provide fascinating accounts of the “action 
research” Aiken carried out. Aiken was interested in developing more than her students’ 
attention and memory, however: “This power of concentration has been sought for, not with the 
idea of making mere memorizers, but in order that they may be able to recall promptly what they 
have gathered from the great realm of facts and principles, so as to hold it in the mind as a basis 
if reasoning, and ultimately, for the purpose of possessing well disciplined and self-controlling 
minds” (Aiken, 1895). In other words, Aiken believed that her program led to successful 
transfer. But even early accounts of Aiken’s work were skeptical of this claim.  L.H. Galbreath, 
of the University of Buffalo, wrote of Aiken’s training program: “However, a great danger for 
theoretical and practical pedagogy arises out of the assumption of the possibility of training a 
power to attend to things in general from special formal exercises. Because one acquires special 
power to attend to things of sight, it does not follow that he can attend with equal skill and 
efficiency to sensations of sound” (Galbreath, 1897).  
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 Aiken was eager to establish that her work was not associated with “animal magnetism, 
hypnotism, and other isms” (30). What is truly remarkable about Aiken’s program—  and what 
sets it apart from the “isms” of the time, such as Pelmanism— is the attention it received from 
psychologists and educational researchers. Aiken’s first book on mind-training, for example, 
includes an encouraging letter from G. Stanley Hall, the first President of the American 
Psychological Association. In 1907, G. M. Whipple presented research conducted on Aiken’s 
program at the American Association for the Advancement of Science. A brief account of this 
presentation was published in Science the following year (Mann, 1908), and a detailed account of 
the study two years later in The Journal of Educational Psychology (Whipple, 1910). To evaluate 
Aiken’s system under “laboratory conditions” Whipple, then at Cornell, conducted two 
experiments. Experiment 1 tested 6 college students before and after practice on the letter 
memorization component of Aiken’s exercises for approximately an hour a day. Experiment 2 
included 3 adult participants and a broader range of Aiken’s exercises for 3 hours a week for 7 
weeks. Whipple used a tachistocope to prevent “eye-moving or the roving of attention” rather 
than Aiken’s revolving chalkboard (Whipple, 1910). Whipple found no evidence that training on 
these exercises led to any general improvements. Instead, he found “a very slight effect” of 
practice “which is easily explicable in terms of habituation to the experimental conditions and of 
development of the “trick” of grouping.” W.S. Foster, a student of Whipple’s, supplemented the 
original study with what he believed was a significant improvement: each participant was a 
trained psychologist. Foster arrived at similar results (Foster, 1911), “That training in these 
experiments has made the observers noticeably better observers or memorizers in general, or 
given them any habits of observing closely or reporting correctly, or finished any ability to meet 
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better and situations generally met with, neither we nor any of the observers themselves believe. 
It seems, therefore as if the value of formal training of our kind had been greatly overestimated.”  
Foster and Whipple both noted that their experiments were imperfect, and that the level 
of participant experience, or the duration of practice and age of the participants may have 
impacted their results; Whipple himself adds a footnote expressing regret at being unable to 
conduct his experiment with children. However, he also adds, in reference to the issues above, 
“neither of these objections seem to us of great moment; we feel that our observers had reached 
their maximal efficiency, and we are unable to believe that children could be brought to exhibit a 
range of apprehension so markedly superior to that of competent and well-trained university 
students and instructors” (Whipple, 1910).  
Although Whipple and Foster did not conduct follow-up experiments with children, Karl 
Dallenbach (a student of Titchener) did. Dallenbach conducted his study within the Ithaca, NY 
public school district, with 29 students. Students trained for ten minutes daily for 17 weeks, with 
progressively more difficult material; furthermore, pre-tests, post-tests, and follow-up tests (41 
weeks after training) were created with untrained material (Dallenbach, 1914a). Unlike Whipple 
and Foster, Dallenbach found that his students did improve, particularly those initially classified 
as having “poor” performance. These improvements persisted at follow-up. Dallenbach collected 
not only grades of his students (which rose following the intervention), but also performance on 
an early Binet Test of Attention. Furthermore, Dallenbach compared the trained students’ 
performance to a set of students who had not been trained (although this test was only collected 
at post-test). Dallenbach noted that grades were significantly higher following the intervention, 
and that students who completed the training outperformed those who had not done so on the 
Binet attention test. Like Whipple and Foster before him, Dallenbach was aware of many of his 
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methodological limitations, but he arrived at very different conclusions. “Our more lengthy 
experiments with children, however, have not only showed more decided practice-effects, but 
have also rendered it at least quite possible, if not practically certain, that these practice effects 
have brought about a permanent modification in the mental traits exercised, and what is more, a 
modification that certainly seems to have made itself felt in a number of ways outside the special 
tests we made (as in an improvement in school work and increased efficiency long afterward in 
supplementary tests of observation and report)” (Dallenbach, 1914b). In 1919 Dallenbach 
repeated his experiment with children with cognitive deficits and arrived at a similar conclusion 
(Dallenbach, 1919), a somewhat remarkable effort considering that even some modern 
researchers improperly generalize training findings between different study populations.   
Whipple, Foster, and Dallenbach eventually moved on from this research, but interest in 
the improvement of basic cognitive skills continued. There are far too many individual studies to 
list in a single review, but some are briefly detailed here. Some of these were used quite widely, 
such as Feuerstein’s “Instrumental Enrichment” program: Reuven Feuerstein, working from a 
Piagetian perspective in the 1960s and reflecting on his experiences with young Holocaust 
survivors, created a variety of facilitator-administered pen and paper tasks meant to improve 
memory and attention in school (Feuerstein & Hamburger, 1965). Others were designed for 
specific purposes, such as the Space Fortress computer game, funded by the Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) with the ultimate goal of improving prefrontal function in 
highly cognitively demanding jobs (e.g. fighter pilots) (Donchin, 1995).  In addition to attempts 
to improve basic cognitive processes, educators and psychologists tested the potential 
effectiveness of reasoning training, logic, philosophy, and even Latin language learning to assess 
whether or not these skills could impact academic achievement and thinking more generally. For 
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example, the “academic games” designed by Layman Allen in the 1960s, including WFF N’ 
Proof and Equations, were the subject of at least two controlled studies (Allen, Allen, & Miller, 
1966; Allen, Allen, & Ross, 1970). Programs developed or used outside of English-speaking 
countries often received less attention. For example, Project Intelligence, a reasoning training 
program developed for classroom use and offered widely in Venezuela, saw minimal adoption in 
the United States (Nickerson, 1985). Also, the children’s concentration program developed by 
Kossow and Vehreschild in East Germany in the early 1980s generally goes unmentioned, 
despite promising findings (Kossow & Vehreschild, 1983; Vehreschild, Kossor, & Schulz-Wulf, 
1984). Finally, while many children of the 1980s remember Logo as their introduction to 
programming, many do not realize that an original motivator behind the program was the 
development of cognitive skills more generally (Clements, 1985). The studies testing these 
interventions included transfer tests of various kinds, including IQ tests, academic achievement, 
and complex reasoning. Many of these studies led to critical discourses that recalled the debates 
regarding Aiken’s intervention; for example, see Stanley and Schild’s 1971 response to Allen’s 
work (Stanley & Schild, 1971), or Shayer and Beasley’s (1987) discussion of Feuerstein’s 
Instrumental Enrichment.  
Given the wide-ranging extent of these interventions, it may seem that a salient question 
is what sort of boundary conditions should be place around the definition of cognitive training. 
For example consider three early programs focused on intervention in early childhood: Project 
Headstart, The Milwaukee Project, and The Abecedarian Project all included, to some extent, 
activities that could be considered designed to make children better at “reasoning, problem 
solving, and learning” (Detterman & Sternberg, 1982). Should they be considered examples of 
cognitive training? For that matter, what about “normal” educational curricula that includes 
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components that arguably improve executive function? I pose these questions here but do not 
suggest that clear answers to them are necessary. Rather, it may be useful to consider this vast 
landscape of programs when drawing conclusions about “cognitive training” from the outcome 
of any individual study. For example, should conclusions about cognitive training drawn from an 
online, computerized, game-like intervention be applied to classroom interventions with a strong 
social component?  
What can one conclude from the example of Catherine Aiken and a review of historical 
work more generally?  First, activities that would today be classified as “cognitive training” have 
long been a subject of heated debate in psychology and education. Second, the focus of the 
research has, from the very start, been on whether “it” works, rather than why “it” might work, 
under what conditions, and for whom; this is despite the fact that early researchers noted that 
these factors mattered. Third, even though researchers noted limitations in their methods (sample 
size, age, amount of training, experimental design, etc.), they nonetheless felt comfortable 
drawing sweeping conclusions about the effectiveness of cognitive training in general. When 
scientists began to focus on specific questions about cognitive training for specific populations 
(e.g., can Space Fortress help military personnel perform complex tasks), they received less 
attention, possibly because neither scientists nor the media were inappropriately generalizing the 
findings. 
This section may rightly bring to mind the old debate over “formal discipline;” that is, the 
question of whether training or experience in one area may transfer to another skill or 
intelligence more generally (see Lehman, Lempert, & Nisbett, 1988 for a more recent study; 18 
for an early historical review). This was often used as justification for teaching Latin or math, 
even if these subjects did not have obvious utility in everyday life. Whipple and Dallenbach were 
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well-aware that their studies were some of the first direct experimental investigations of this 
theory and that the issue had not been definitively settled by Thorndike and Woodworth (1901), 
although it certainly went out of favor as a result of their work. As Jenner states in his 1914 
review, “for some years now we have not dared to speak of a general mental power and have 
ventured to mention formal discipline only to kindred spirits and then in a scarcely audible 
whisper” (Jenner, 1914). Despite this, the many studies included in reviews from Rugg (1916) 
and Orata (1941) make it clear that cognitive training research continued unabated after 
Thorndike’s study. Even if it fell out of favor in certain subfields of psychology and education, 
the interest in cognitive training, from scholars and the public alike, continued in various forms 
throughout the 20th century. 
Finally, there is evidence that Whipple remained intensely interested in questions about 
the efficacy of mind-training and the mechanisms of transfer in the years following his initial 
study. In his preface to C. P. Wang’s 1916 dissertation (Wang, 1916) on visual sense training in 
children, he wrote that “Contributions to the experimental study of the transfer of training 
(formal discipline) scarcely need either apology or introduction in a period when, despite the 
considerable amount of investigation, so very much remains undetermined with respect to the 
amount of such transfer and the mechanism by means of which it takes place.” Perhaps it was 
still on his mind in 1922, when he completed his educational psychology textbook, “Problems in 
Educational Psychology” (Whipple, 1923). One of the problems in the book reads as follows: 
“Catherine Aiken describes a series of exercises (columns of figures, groups of dots to be 
counted, important dates, sets of drawings, etc.) to be placed on a revolving blackboard, which is 
then whirled about before the pupils in such a way as to expose the material for a few seconds 
only. These exercises are strongly urged as a means of developing concentrated attention, quick 
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and accurate observation, and of accelerating the whole process of learning. Miss Aiken reports 
very wonderful results from the use of such exercises for five or ten minutes daily.” He then asks 
“Is there psychological warrant for the use of such exercises as a means of developing attention 
and observation? Would you advocate the introduction of such exercises as a stock feature of 
school training?” A review of more recent literature illustrates that the same questions that 
Whipple fixated on remain unanswered today. 
 
The Present Issue 
 
In 2008, Susanne Jaeggi, Martin Buschkuehl, and colleagues published their graduate 
work in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (Jaeggi et al., 2008); they found 
that practice on a dual n-back task led to improvements in fluid intelligence. The dual n-back 
task requires individuals to listen to a stream of letters and judge whether a letter was the same as 
the one presented n trials previously, while simultaneously viewing a set of boxes on a screen 
and judging whether the same box “lit up” n trials previously. Fluid intelligence is defined as the 
ability to solve abstract, novel problems that require little knowledge and was measured before 
and after training by matrix reasoning tests that require participants to judge which of several 
options best fits into an array of figures. Tests of fluid intelligence are correlated with working 
memory and prefrontal function more generally (Engle, Kane, & Tuholski, 1999) because they 
require keeping track of and testing numerous rules during the course of problem solving 
(Carpenter, Just, & Shell, 1990).  
The dramatic improvements detailed by Jaeggi et al. (2008) received a considerable 
amount of attention from the scientific community and the popular press. Additionally, 
companies offering cognitive training software often took advantage of their findings for 
marketing purposes (e.g., Learning RX, Lumos Labs, and CogMed). The media hype around 
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Jaeggi’s paper emphasized its putative novelty; for example, Alexis Madrigal (2009) wrote in 
Wired, “Fluid intelligence was previously thought to be genetically hard-wired.” As the historical 
summary above suggests, such claims were inaccurate.  Many studies explicitly tested and found 
improvements in fluid intelligence, even if they did not necessarily use the term fluid 
intelligence. More generally, there has always been a debate regarding the relative importance of 
nature (i.e., genetics) and nurture (i.e., experiences) in the development of intelligence. One 
would be hard pressed to find a scientist who argues that intelligence (including fluid 
intelligence) is entirely genetically determined and not at all affected by experience. The Jaeggi 
et al. (2008) paper is a bit more nuanced in discussing this issue than the media reports and 
acknowledges that there is a history of cognitive training research but that successful transfer has 
been difficult to achieve.   
The interpretation of the Jaeggi et al. (2008) study in terms of a paradigmatic shift within 
a false dichotomy of fixed versus malleable intelligence, with little attention to historical context, 
is one reason for the swift critique the study received. There were also numerous concerns 
regarding the research methods of the study, most notably, the lack of an active control group. 
Furthermore, scientists were concerned that the general public might expend resources on 
unproven products, possibly to the detriment of other beneficial activities.  Adding to the 
controversy, Redick and colleagues tried to replicate the Jaeggi findings with a somewhat better 
controlled trial but found no evidence of gains in fluid intelligence (Klauer & Phye, 2008).  
Many additional studies continued to ask the question, “does cognitive training improve 
intelligence?” One could replace “intelligence” with attention or working memory, and find an 
equally generous body of work. However, this question, like the question “does medicine cure 
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disease,” is inappropriate. That it continues to be asked, over 100 years after the studies of 
Whipple and Dallenbach, should give researchers reason to pause and take stock. 
 Why do some studies find a positive impact of cognitive training whereas others do not?  
One reason is that “cognitive training” refers to such a broad range of activities (e.g., commercial 
programs like Cogmed, laboratory tasks such as the n-back, and off-the-shelf games). It is not 
possible to draw conclusions regarding cognitive training as a whole with a single empirical 
study. The extent to which one can reasonably generalize from one intervention to others is not 
clear, and researchers are not yet well-aware of what intervention characteristics may be 
important for transfer.  Consider, for example, different working memory interventions.  In 
addition to the n-back task, one can train working memory by having individuals remember 
sequences of items (i.e., span tasks; see (Chein & Morrison, 2010).  Training might be spaced 
across time or take place within a shorter time frame (Wang, Zhou, & Shah, 2014. And studies 
may involve fixed block of training (say, across one month) or add “booster” sessions later on 
(Ball et al., 2002).  Cognitive interventions may vary on numerous other dimensions (which 
processes are practiced, type of instructions, game-like features, amount of training, 
computerized or not, etc.).  
It is also difficult to judge whether or not interventions are effective above and beyond 
the influence of various confounding factors.  Consider, for example, a study that tests whether 
improvements on an intelligence test are due to a placebo effect by asking participants about 
their beliefs. Unfortunately, this too is problematic. Hundreds of participants may be required to 
adequately test whether or not a construct with a true moderate effect size had an impact on an 
outcome variable above and beyond a reasonably reliable confound (Westfall & Yarkoni, 
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2016).Attempting to statistically control for several factors may require impractically large 
sample sizes.   
A related problem is that many studies test participants on a large number of laboratory 
tasks or surveys but lack the sample size needed to conduct multiple comparison corrections. Our 
own studies suffer from this concern, as do many others.  One concern associated with having a 
large number of transfer measures or a large sample size has to do with the quality of testing 
implementation. Outcome measures, when presented to participants in rapid succession, 
shortened for time constraints, and administered over several hours, may be less reliable than 
ideal. The Redick et al. (2013) study may have exactly this problem: participants performed 
seventeen demanding cognitive tests, several of which were shortened.  Though the reliability of 
their tasks is normally high in standard administration, reliability under these conditions is not 
clear. In general, one ironic aspect of cognitive training research is that a large sample size is 
crucial, but studies with large sample size have their own problems.  Studies with large sample 
sizes often have much less control over the training regimens or quality of data collection.  The 
Owen et al. (Owen et al., 2010) study, which included thousands of participants, is one such 
example; the administration of tasks is not at all standardized and training dosage was highly 
variable. 
A related concern is presentation of post-hoc or selective analyses (Schwaighofer, 
Fischer, & Buhner, 2015). In a follow-up study published in PNAS, for example, Jaeggi et al. 
tested children on a battery of tests and compared performance of a group that received a single 
n-back training with a control group that learned science facts (Jaeggi et al., 2011).  Overall, 
there was no impact of the cognitive training intervention on the included measures of fluid 
intelligence. However, upon noting vast individual differences in improvement on the n-back 
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task, Jaeggi and colleagues also tested whether or not children who actually improved in the 
training also improved on matrix reasoning. They did find improvements for this group. Also, 
children who viewed the training as “too difficult” did not get better on the training task. Jaeggi 
and colleagues interpreted these findings to mean that some students were easily discouraged and 
thus did not benefit from the intervention. But this finding could also be explained by assuming 
that people who can learn well improve from their experiences during training and are also more 
likely to benefit from taking the same test twice. This is a valid alternative explanation. 
One final limitation is that there is minimal testing for ‘real-life’ outcomes (e.g., how 
much better does a child do in school?).  Instead, most outcome measures are laboratory tasks, 
surveys, or standardized tests. Many studies use performance on matrix reasoning tests as their 
main outcome measure. Although performance on such tests is correlated with real-life success 
(e.g., the ability to learn new facts), scoring better on these tests does not mean that one will 
actually be better in real-world tasks.  Some studies do include some real-life outcomes or 
ecologically valid tasks (e.g., Golden et al., 2014; Deveau, Ozer, & Seitz, 2014), but these 
studies are few.   
Finally, studies also differ in terms of the samples tested. Recall two studies mentioned 
earlier: Jaeggi et al. (2008) used students from the University of Bern, Switzerland, and found 
successful transfer to fluid intelligence. Redick et al. (Redick et al., 2013) used students from 
Michigan State, Georgia Tech, and non-students from the Atlanta area and did not find transfer. 
There are other methodological merits and concerns regarding both studies, but the populations 
examined in each study are different enough that it is possible that the divergent outcomes could 
be driven by demographics. For example, two factors that may influence whether one benefits 
from training are socioeconomic status and motivation (Segretin et al., 2014; Jaeggi et al., 2011). 
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The list goes on – personality, age, baseline ability, and many others. But many studies do not 
examine these characteristics, and too few researchers take the step that Dallenbach did early on 
to replicate his training study with children who have cognitive difficulties. Thus it is not 
possible to discern the extent to which these difficulties influence performance (Strobach & 
Karbach, 2016). Until recently, few researchers focused specifically on the role that individual 
differences may play in the outcome of these interventions. Nonetheless, Elizabeth Hall, in her 
response to Piaget’s dismissal of the “American question” in the interview that opens this 
chapter, does ask whether an individual-difference factor (in this case, writing speed) might in 
fact provide some support for intervention. While Piaget continued to caution in this interview 
against any “acceleration” of learning despite this rejoinder, other researchers, such as Richard 
Snow, have long suggested that the existence of any individual differences in “personality, 
ability, or motivational characteristics can serve as a source of aptitude or inaptitude for learning 
from instruction in some given setting, and can thus be a focus for research” (Snow, 1977). 
Snow, who saw intelligence as “both an aptitude and an outcome for education” (Snow, 1982) 
would likely not be surprised that the last few years have seen an expanded focus on the role 
these factors play in the outcome of training interventions. The following chapter focuses more 
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The list of issues discussed at the conclusion of the previous chapter is not exhaustive, 
but is intended to provide the reader with some idea for why most studies are far from 
conclusive. Although it may be easy to scoff at the tiny samples and limited methods used by 
Whipple in his century-old cognitive training experiments, contemporary studies often share 
similar issues. Why would psychologists design studies that are underpowered or that have clear 
methodological problems? In part, they do so because there is a tradeoff such that avoiding one 
problem (e.g., sample size) leads to another problem (e.g., poor control over intervention).  
Researchers include a variety of transfer measures all designed to answer different questions: to 
see if there is change in fluid intelligence measures, academic achievement measures, or 
assessments of basic skills that underlie more complex measures. It is practically impossible, 
because of cost and time constraints, to recruit enough participants to make up for the large 
number of planned statistical tests.  
One potential answer to this conundrum is the use of meta-analytic techniques, as these 
allow researchers to determine not only whether an intervention has a meaningful effect over a 
large body of studies, but also to reveal potential moderators—such as demographic makeup, 
pre-existing individual differences, or training dosage—that may influence the outcome of the 
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intervention. Unfortunately, the extant meta-analyses arrive at very different conclusions and do 
little to settle the issue (Au et al., 2015; Karbach & Verhaeghen, 2014; Schwaighofer, Fischer, & 
Buhner, 2015; Melby-Lervag & Hulme, 2013; Melby-Lervag, Redick, & Hulme, 2016; Weicker, 
Villringer, & Thone-Otto, 2016).  While Au et al., Karr et al., and Karbach and Verhaeghen 
conclude that training executive functions like working memory may be effective in improving 
capacities such as fluid intelligence, Melby-Lervag and Hulme suggest that transfer gains are 
non-significant or minor at best.  These varied outcomes arise because of key differences in how 
they were conducted, such as the populations included and the type of intervention used. These 
decisions, along with the choice of statistical procedures, have a substantial impact on the 
outcomes of meta-analyses.  A nice demonstration of this point is a pair of analyses conducted 
by Van Elk et al. (Van Elk et al., 2015) about the effect of religious priming on prosocial 
behavior.  Responding to a meta-analysis that that found that religious priming has a positive 
impact on prosocial behavior in religious participants (Shariff et al., 2016), van Elk conducted 
two publication bias correction analyses (PET-PEESE and Bayesian) using the same data as 
Shariff et al. Although each of these methods is reasonable, they ultimately arrive at different 
conclusions. Furthermore, to return to the medication analogy, it is impossible to draw 
conclusions about a broad question (does medication work) by combining studies of different 
medications and illnesses in a single analysis.  The conundrum is that each individual study 
differs on so many dimensions that statistically accounting for these differences may be, in 
essence, the equivalent of reducing the sample size back to the level of individual studies. And as 
Stegenga (Stegenga, 2011) writes, “Meta-analysis fails to provide objective grounds for 
intersubjective assessments of hypotheses because numerous decisions must be made when 
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performing a meta-analysis which allow wide latitude for subjective idiosyncrasies to influence 
its outcome.” 
Thus the existence of meta-analysis as a technique does not end the need to explore factors 
that may determine the outcome of cognitive training. It is likely that certain individual-difference 
factors such as age, baseline performance, socioeconomic status, personality, experience with 
games, and motivation, among many others, may impact the outcome of the intervention for any 
individual participant. These differences have significant implications not only for our ability to 
improve our theoretical understanding of cognitive training, but also for the real-world efficacy of 
any individual intervention. However, many extant cognitive training studies do not examine these 
factors. Furthermore, most use sample sizes that are too small to adequately account for them 
individually, let alone the extent they may interact with each other. Conducting larger, better-
powered studies that allow scientists to understand the effects of these differences may help to 
explain the inconsistency across studies thus far. This chapter largely focuses on the evidence that 
certain individual-difference factors may influence the outcome of cognitive training.  
 
Individual-Difference Factors That May Influence Cognitive Training Outcomes 
 
A full discussion of all the individual-difference factors that might influence the outcome 
of cognitive training would require a book by itself. For a comprehensive review of how 
individual-difference factors impact cognition more generally, the Handbook of Individual 
Differences in Cognition (Gruszka et al. 2012) provides a detailed discussion. This introduction, 
however, focuses on individual-difference factors that have been examined in previous cognitive 
training research. This list, perhaps unsurprisingly considering the previous paragraphs, is fairly 
short – only a handful of the many cognitive training studies published thus far have explicitly 
examined individual-difference factors. At present, these studies consider age, baseline 
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performance, personality factors, and motivation. Readers well-versed in the study of individual 
differences may notice other factors that may be meaningful predictors in other contexts – such as 
gender or cultural factors2 – missing from this chapter. While these certainly merit further study, 
they are not covered here simply because extant research does not yet suggest that they make a 




The potential contribution of baseline performance (either on the training task itself or on 
the set of cognitive tests used at pre-test) to improvements on untrained assessments merits 
primacy in a discussion of individual differences. While many individual-difference factors have 
not been specifically studied in the context of cognitive training, most of these have been examined 
in the context of baseline performance on a variety of cognitive abilities, such as working memory 
or executive function. If baseline performance impacts the outcome of a training intervention, it is 
reasonable to suggest that the other individual-difference factors that influence baseline 
performance merit further investigation; the influence of baseline performance in a domain on its 
trainability has long been a focus of cognitive training research (Verhaeghen et al. 1992; Willis 
1989; see also Snow 1991). Baseline performance on working memory tasks may influence the 
outcome of cognitive training in one of two directions. One possibility is that those who perform 
worse prior to the intervention have more room to improve following training, and thus may 
experience greater gains. Alternatively, those with higher baseline performance may be better able 
to benefit from completing a cognitive training regimen – they may perform better at the training 
task over the course of the intervention and thus also experience greater improvements; these 
                                                          
2 While Au et al. (2014) did find differences between cognitive training studies conducted in the United States 




participants may also be more likely to complete the entire intervention and not drop out of a study 
(Jaeggi et al. 2014). One factor to keep in mind is that the source of individual differences in 
baseline performance may differ across studies: in some studies, lower baseline individuals may 
have less experience, be younger or older, and so forth. Thus it is not surprising that baseline 
performance may have different effects across studies. It is also possible that different training 
paradigms may result in different patterns of performance across high- and low-baseline 
participants. For example, process-based training often results in higher gains for individuals with 
lower baseline performance, while strategy-based training programs often result in greater gains 
for high-baseline individuals (Karbach and Unger 2014). Thus a sensible approach to resolving 
these issues is to focus on the underlying individual differences that may influence baseline 
performance as well as training paradigm characteristics. 
 Of the few studies examining baseline performance and cognitive training, a number 
support the former possibility – that is, that those who start with lower levels of performance 
experience greater gains. In two studies by Zinke et al. (2012; 2014) individuals who performed 
worse at baseline, across multiple training paradigms of both working memory and executive 
control, experienced larger gains on the training task. Although Zinke et al. did not directly 
examine how baseline performance on untrained WM or fluid intelligence measures impacts 
transfer gains, they did find that, like Jaeggi et al. (2011), Schmiedek et al. (2010), and Chein and 
Morrison (2010), the amount of improvement on the training task does contribute to the amount 
of transfer gains on certain executive control and verbal WM tasks. These studies suggest that 
individuals who begin with lower baseline performance on the trained tasks may have stood to 
improve more at both the training and related transfer tasks. One possibility, as Zinke and 
colleagues discuss, is that individuals with higher baseline performance may be closer to ceiling 
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performance at the task (some tasks are designed with a fixed level of maximum challenge, while 
others remain adaptive as long as participants continue to improve). If improvement in the task is 
a necessary precursor to transfer gains, it is also possible that modifying the task to permit high-
performers to continue improving beyond present ceiling levels might also permit them to 
experience greater transfer gain.  
 Few studies have specifically looked at how pre-test performance on the transfer tasks may 
influence transfer gain, although consistent with the previously mentioned small studies, one 
recent, large-scale study found that individuals who performed worse at pre-test on the set of 
transfer tasks also showed greater improvements on these tasks following training than those with 
higher pre-test scores (Hardy et al. 2015). This finding is also consistent with research conducted 
on the ACTIVE training project with older adults (Willis and Caskie 2013) that found that lower 
performance on certain baseline measures was correlated with greater improvement after a period 
of cognitive training. While these studies provide some evidence that lower-performing 
individuals may stand to benefit more from the training than those who are closer to ceiling, the 
relationship between baseline ability and transfer may be fairly complex and might also be 
influenced by methodological differences, such as the design of the intervention or the adaptivity 
algorithms used to increase or decrease the difficulty of training. And finally, some of the outcome 
measures might not be sensitive enough to detect changes at the upper end of the scale3, which 





                                                          
3 For example, the difficulty of the adaptive n-back task does not necessarily increase in a linear fashion; the 
increase in ability necessary to advance may be higher from 5- to 6-back than from 2- to 3-back. However, it is 
difficult to measure improvements in ability in participants at higher n-back levels unless they result in a new n-





 A substantial body of research provides evidence for the effects of age on cognitive 
plasticity across the lifespan (Guye et al., 2016); it should be unsurprising that age has often been 
linked to differences in transfer improvements following cognitive training. Several studies have 
found that improvements on untrained tasks are smaller for older adults than younger adults (Zinke 
et al. 2014; Brehmer et al. 2012; Schmiedek et al. 2010), and even smaller for old-old adults, when 
compared to young-old individuals (Borella et al. 2014). However, meta-analytic work has 
revealed inconsistent findings on this issue: While one recent meta-analysis found no difference 
between younger and older adults in transfer improvements, (Karbach and Verhaeghen 2014), 
another found that younger adults improved more on these tasks than older adults (Wass et al. 
2012). Considering the fact that that these meta-analyses include different sets of studies based on 
differing parameters (for example, Wass et al. include a larger range of ages than Karbach and 
Verhaeghen), it is difficult to compare them to each other. 
Given the extent to which age impacts baseline performance on a wide variety of cognitive 
tasks (Salthouse 1996), there is a reasonable impetus for examining the effects of age in cognitive 
training research. Furthermore, if training mitigates the effects of age-related cognitive decline, 
older adult populations may benefit the most from cognitive training (Richmond et al. 2011). 
Perhaps most problematic, from the perspective of critiquing extant research, is that age effects 
have generally been examined only in the context of older versus younger adults,  with the 
exception of Borella et al. (2014) mentioned above. Surprisingly, little is known about how age 
may impact transfer (or study completion, for that matter, see Motivation below) in individuals 
who are older than college age but younger than retirement, or among children of varying ages. 
Until a truly comprehensive study is made that includes the entire lifespan – from children to young 
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adults to middle age to older adults – a significant gap remains in our understanding of age as an 





 Since most cognitive training work has been conducted by cognitive psychologists, it is 
perhaps unsurprising that personality and temperament have not been thoroughly examined in 
the context of cognitive training. However, some recent research suggests certain parts of the 
five-factor personality model may be predictive in the outcome of these interventions.  
 For example, Studer-Luethi and colleagues (2012) found that individuals who had high 
ratings on the conscientiousness portion of the five-factor inventory were more likely to perform 
well on both an n-back working memory training intervention as well as related near transfer 
tasks. While this finding makes sense given that conscientiousness is generally associated with 
persistence and self-discipline, higher conscientiousness was associated with lower far transfer 
performance. The authors suggest that the participants developed task-specific skills that 
prevented far transfer. This result merits further investigation, particularly if one takes into 
consideration the fact that this study was fairly well-powered.  
 In the same study, Studer-Luethi et al. (2012) found that that higher levels of neuroticism 
were associated with significantly higher levels of transfer to matrix reasoning tests for 
participants who completed a single n-back version of the training, but that lower levels of 
neuroticism were associated with higher transfer scores for individuals from the dual n-back 
group. Studer-Luethi and colleagues posit that the dual n-back version of the task is more 
difficult than the single n-back version, and this “led subjects with high levels of neuroticism in a 
suboptimal activation state which derailed complex cognitive transfer processes” (2012). 
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However, this explanation is not completely satisfactory, given that participants in both 
conditions trained on an adaptive version of the n-back task and arguably should have been 
similarly challenged, regardless if a single or dual n-back version was used. Since there was no 
significant main effect of neuroticism within both groups combined, another possible explanation 
is that neuroticism does not play an important role in the outcome of training. Similarly, in 
another reasonably well-powered study, Urbánek and Marček (2015) find a differential 
relationship between training type, personality, and transfer such that participants in the single n-
back training group (but not a dual n-back or mental rotation condition) experienced greater 
transfer gain if they rated higher on traits generally associated with neuroticism. Again, however, 
it is worth noting that this study found no significant effect of training on transfer versus an 
active control group, and that this personality finding was only revealed after examining a 
training group on its own. Thus, an argument could be made that the (limited) extant research 




Despite being an entire subfield of psychological research, little research has examined 
how a participant’s motivation, either to complete a training intervention or to improve his or her 
cognitive capacity, impacts training and transfer. Few studies examine the impact that self-
efficacy, goal orientation, mastery beliefs, mindset, and many other motivation-related constructs. 
There is some evidence, however, that this is a space worth exploring. For example, a number of 
previous training studies inform participants that they may improve their intelligence or cognitive 
function during the study (for example, Jaeggi et al. 2008; Klingberg et al. 2005); while other 
studies only mention practicing computerized tasks (Redick et al. 2013). One study suggests that 
personal beliefs about the malleability of intelligence may contribute to the amount of transfer 
38 
 
after a cognitive training intervention (Jaeggi et al. 2014). Individuals who believed that 
intelligence could be improved experienced larger transfer gains following training. Although the 
beliefs-by-intervention interaction was not significant in this instance, it does suggest that personal 
beliefs about whether one is able to improve cognition—itself a major factor in how motivated one 
might be to complete cognitive training—could have a substantial impact on the outcome of 
training. Similarly, a study by Foroughi and colleagues (2016) found that participants recruited 
with materials that promoted IQ gains led to greater improvements after a training intervention 
than those recruited through flyers without this messaging. However, this study only included a 
single training session. Nonetheless, these studies provide preliminary evidence that Dweck’s 
mindset work might have relevance in helping to understand the outcome of cognitive training 
(Dweck, 1999). This perspective could explain the outcome of Foroughi’s study, for example: if 
the recruitment materials led participants to believe that an intervention was capable of making 
them smarter, they may be more engaged in the study, and thus may be more likely to improve 
than participants who do not expect to benefit. 
The use of payment or other forms of extrinsic motivators as a means of incentive may also 
influence the outcome of an intervention. The sole meta-analysis that examined compensation 
levels in the context of transfer gain provides some very preliminary evidence of a negative impact 
of remuneration on transfer improvements, but this effect does not survive the removal of an outlier 
study (Au et al. 2014). Payment is often used to counter the high dropout rates that accompany 
cognitive training studies, but few studies consider the implications that high dropout rates might 
have on a study. One study of cognitive training by Double & Birney (2016) examined the effects 
of baseline characteristics on both the outcome of training and dropout and found that while 
individuals who did not complete the training did not differ on motivation-related measures, they 
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were significantly younger, and less conscientious, than those who completed the study. 
Furthermore, a study by Jaeggi, Buschkuehl, Shah and Jonides (2013) found that participants who 
ultimately dropped out of the study also reported being less engaged during training.  
Finally, another point related to motivation is the inclusion of “game-like” elements in 
cognitive training paradigms that are meant to motivate or engage participants. A number of 
cognitive training programs have been designed to mimic the motivational elements of video 
games (Jaeggi et al. 2011; Klingberg et al. 2005) while others do not include these game-like 
features, such as scoring, feedback, or animations. While little work has examined this in the 
context of cognitive training, there is a considerable body of literature dating back to the 1980s 
that suggests that these features may have significant impact on one’s experience of a game or 
program (Malone, 1980). More recently, studies that have attempted to “gamify” education 
curricula (Aguilar et al., 2014) have found that these elements may improve student engagement, 
although it is unknown whether these elements would have a similar effect on the outcome of 
cognitive training. Ultimately, more work is needed to better understand the role of motivation in 
cognitive training as well as what researchers can do to best motivate their participants. Given that 
motivation could potentially impact recruitment, drop-out, and performance during the training, 
these studies provide some impetus for continuing work to investigate participant motivational 




 This review suggests that none of the individual-difference factors discussed above has 
been conclusively and consistently found to impact the outcome of cognitive training 
interventions. All of them are worthy of future study. However, considering the relative lack of 
direct empirical work that explores motivation and cognitive training, and given the focus and 
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interest on the relationship between motivation and educational interventions more generally 
(Schunk, Meece, & Pintrich, 2013), the remainder of this manuscript focuses on three studies 
that explore the relationship between motivation and the outcome of cognitive training. The first 
study (Chapter 3) addresses the question of whether training features that are designed to be 
motivational do indeed increase participant motivation and subsequently lead to greater training 
and transfer performance. The second study (Chapter 4) investigates the preliminary result 
detailed in Au et al. (2014), that is, does monetary compensation have an undermining effect on 
the outcome of cognitive training, possibly by negatively impacting one’s motivational 
orientation. The third study (Chapter 5) examines whether a variety of individual-difference 
factors, including motivation, impact the outcome of cognitive training combined with tDCS 
stimulation, a technique that has seen increasing use as a means of boosting training effects. A 
final discussion (Chapter 6) reviews the findings from this body of work and considers the 
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A key challenge in cognitive training research is how to keep participants engaged in 
training. Training programs are often challenging for participants to complete, and it is expected 
that they will remain focused on a task or set of tasks for 20 to 40 minutes at a time (Jaeggi et al., 
2008; Thompson et al. 2013), for anywhere between a few days (Rueda et al., 2005) to 100 
sessions (Schmiedek et al., 2010). Because transfer improvements generally require several 
hours of training (Jaeggi et al, 2008; Stepankova et al., 2013) it is important that participants in 
training paradigms remain compliant during training. Additionally, it may be necessary for 
participants to improve in the training program in order to experience transfer on untrained tests 
(Jaeggi et al., 2011).  
Unfortunately the time commitment and effort required to complete a cognitive training 
study is often such that many participants do not complete the experiment. Studies often have 
high dropout rates, including some higher than 25% (Jaeggi et al, 2013; Redick et al., 2013). A 
variety of individual-difference factors may contribute to a participant’s ability to complete the 
training, such as baseline ability in the training task and one’s intrinsic motivation to complete a 
training program (Jaeggi et al., 2013). 
While individual-difference factors are generally outside of the experimenters’ control, 
the design of the training program may also contribute to a participant’s engagement in the task, 
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and these game design elements are often relatively simple to adjust. Cognitive training 
paradigms vary widely in the type of motivational elements they include, however, and while 
some studies have focused on recruiting unpaid, intrinsically motivated individuals that may be 
more likely to engage with and complete a training regimen (Jaeggi et al., 2013), others have 
utilized substantial financial compensation as a means of encouraging participants to complete 
the training (Redick et al., 2013; Thompson et al. 2013). Factors that may impact a participant’s 
ability and willingness to engage, comply, and improve in training have been the subject of some 
interest in recent research. Studies with children often utilize prizes, certificates, and display of 
high scores to encourage individuals to excel at and complete the training (Holmes, Gathercole, 
& Dunning., 2009; Jaeggi et al., 2011; Wang et al., under review this issue). 
One topic that has not gotten much attention is how game-based motivational elements 
may contribute to improvements in training and transfer. This is somewhat surprising, 
considering that elements such as score, tutorials and scaffolding, theming, and feedback are 
often prominently featured in cognitive training programs. Cognitive psychologists and 
neuroscientists often find themselves in the role of game designer (Mane & Donchin., 1989; 
Anguera et al., 2013), and even some of the most basic training paradigms have at least included 
a motivational chart showing player improvements (Jaeggi et al., 2010). Other training programs, 
particularly those targeted at children (Jaeggi et al., 2011; Klingberg et al., 2005), look and feel 
more like traditional video games with appealing art and sound design. Cognitive training games 
are similar to certain types of entertainment games – specifically, those that Gee (2006) would 
describe as “problem games,” -- that involve simple, repetitive mechanics, rather than large, 
open worlds for the player to explore. Almost all tasks used in cognitive training games, from n-
back to useful-field-of view to conflict resolution tasks, can be translated into fairly simple 
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gameplay mechanics (Klingberg et al., 2005; Rueda et al., 2005; Jaeggi et al., 2011; Ball et al., 
2010; Alloway, 2012).  
While game-based motivational elements have not been well-studied within cognitive 
training research, some of them have been examined by educational game researchers. Overall, 
the perspective among these researchers has been that many of these motivational elements aid 
motivation, and, ultimately, learning (Fishman & Deterding, 2013).  For example, one popular 
game element, persistent scoring (the presentation of a number that represents player 
performance and changes as the player completes the task successfully) likely encourages 
engagement and motivation (Toupes, Kerne, & Hamilton 2009). However, the way this scoring 
is implemented —that is, whether points are earned specifically for completing tasks essential to 
the learning goal or are awarded for other non-core actions— can determine if scoring hinders or 
helps learning on the task (Habgood & Ainsworth, 2013). The inclusion of game features may 
either support or subvert participant motivation to engage depending on how well they tie in with 
the learning task and the participant’s pre-existing motivational framework. For example, 
imagine a cognitive training game that includes an extra bonus round where players perform 
some other task non-essential to the training component, such as answering a trivia question. If 
the number of points possible for the bonus round matches or is greater than that awarded during 
the core task, participants may be less motivated to perform well during the training portion of 
the game. This contrasts with situations where the reward is directly reinforcing of the 
performance task. In one related example, a review of reading incentive programs supported 
using literacy-related rewards to motivate students (Fawson & Moore, 1999); one study found 
that students who received a book as a reward following a reading program were more motivated 
to participate than those who received a token prize (Marinak & Gambrell, 2008). 
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Psychologists who study motivation are also interested in game-based motivational 
features (Ryan et al., 2006; Przyblyski, Rigby & Ryan, 2010), possibly because games are an 
ideal context for understanding the tension between intrinsic motivation and extrinsic reward. 
Elements such as scoring and feedback may impact a player’s intrinsic motivation and may also 
contribute to his/her success in learning the content included in the game. For example, in 
Malone’s examination of intrinsically and extrinsically motivating game elements, different 
versions of the game Breakout were created that included elements of feedback, such as 
persistent score and breaking bricks (Malone, 1981). Versions of the game with both of these 
elements were rated much more highly on a scale of enjoyment by players than versions where 
they were not present. Theming (referred to as “fantasy” by Malone) was also evaluated and 
found to significantly contribute to a child’s interest in the game, although gender differences 
were identified in the type of theme each child enjoyed the most.  
More recently, some focus has been applied to issues of motivational game elements in 
cognitive research; however, the research has thus far been inconclusive. Two recent studies 
compared game versions that included a variety of motivational elements, such as those studied 
by Malone, to more basic versions of a task. While Prins et al. (2011) found that including game 
elements such as theming, game-like feedback, and animations increased motivation as well as 
performance for children completing a working memory training game, recent work from 
Hawkins et al. (2013), found that the addition of similar game features improved the player 
experience but not the quality of data collected during a cognitive task. One possible explanation 
of these mixed results is that the amount of time spent with the game experience also matters – 
while Prins and colleagues examined the effect of game features over three weekly sessions, the 
Hawkins et al. study included one single session of play for the games used.  
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It is also possible that the impact of scoring and other game-like features may differ from 
game to game, depending on factors such as the goals, difficulty, and demographics of the users. 
Conclusions drawn from one study cannot necessarily be applied more generally to other types 
of games or interactive experiences. Nevertheless, no study thus far has systematically examined 
the impact that individual game elements, rather than several features together, have on player 
performance; previous studies such as those from Hawkins et al (2013) and Prins et al (2011) 
compare versions of the game with a variety of features to versions of the game without any 
features present. Therefore, findings from this present research will be of considerable interest to 
game designers beyond the cognitive training space. By separating out the most popular game-
elements included in these training games, such as scoring, lives and leveling, prizes, and 
theming, we may better understand the extent that these elements contribute to participant 
engagement and improvements on the task. 
To examine how these elements impacted performance on a visuospatial working 
memory training task, we designed several versions of a three-day working memory game based 
on a cognitive training task used in previous research (Jaeggi et al., 2011). In this study, the 
question of interest was whether removing any additional feature might have significant effect on 
motivation or training gain, and thus each version had one element removed4. In the original 
version of the task, many motivational elements were included, such as changing themes and art, 
display of score, lives and levels, and prizes and certificates awarded for player compliance and 
performance. We created new versions of this game, each with one of these elements removed, 
as well as one with several game-like motivational features absent from the training task. Even 
                                                          
4 However, an alternative design, where a single feature is added to a completely bare-bones version of a task, offers 
an interesting possibility for future research. 
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without persistent score, lives, prizes, and changing theme, the task was still game-like, with 
whimsical art and scoring presented between rounds.  
This point brings up a significant additional note: why versions of the game with a single 
element removed were created rather than several versions with one single element added to a 
bare-bones version of the task. This would likely have been the approach taken if the 
experimenters had created a completely new game, however, each version of the task is a 
modification of a training game used in a previous cognitive training study (Jaeggi et al., 2011). 
Removing a single element generally did not impede gameplay but some elements are 
interdependent with each other. For example, the prizes students could pick at the end of each 
day in most conditions were offered based on the total score; students with a higher score could 
pick prizes of greater value. While other types of feedback (such as the display of leveling on 
screen) still gave sense of their performance and could be connected to earning better prizes, the 
addition of performance-based prizes without any additional context may not have made sense to 
the player 
We hypothesized that there would be a differential effect of motivational feature for 
learning on the training task. For example, existing research on the potential negative effects of 
extrinsic reward, such as Marinak and Gambrell (2008), led us to expect that the removal of 
prizes might increase learning on the training task. However, in general, the findings from the 
Prins et al. (2011) study led us to expect that students in the group with all motivational elements 
included would outperform students in the no motivational element group. Additionally, students 
in a previous study using the same version of the game as in the “all motivational features” group 
who reported greater enjoyment of the task outperformed those who did not enjoy the task as 
much (Jaeggi et al., 2011). The results from Hawkins et al (2013) and Prins et al (2011) 
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suggested that students in the group with the most motivational elements would rate more highly 
on self-report measures of intrinsic motivation or enjoyment; it is possible that the versions of 
the game that students enjoyed more would also be the versions where they experienced greater 
improvement on the training task. Thus, we expected that removing other features commonly 
included in games, such as changing theme, scoring, and lives and levels would have a 
deleterious effect on learning the training task.  
We included an outcome measure relatively similar (but not identical) to the training task, 
in which players were required to identify if a given object presented on screen matched an 
object presented on screen n-items earlier. Despite the similarity between the transfer task and 
the outcome measure, we did not expect to see significant transfer gain due to the limited three-
day training duration. Rather, we primarily expected to find differences in player self-reported 
and observed motivation and performance on the task based on which elements were excluded. 
We hope that a better understanding of how the game-like elements included in this study impact 
motivation and performance will help researchers design better, more scientifically useful 
cognitive training paradigms. 
Methods 
 
Participants. One hundred twenty-eight students were recruited from seven different 
school-based summer camps in the southern Michigan region (average age = 10.56 years, SD = 
2.48, range 5 – 14, 37% girls). Students were invited to participate in a three-day experiment in 
which no compensation was provided outside of the possibility of prizes or certificates in some 
variants of the intervention; recruitment occurred at tables outside the entrance to the summer 
camps immediately prior to the start of each camp. Written informed consent was collected from 
both parents and students prior to participation. Students were also asked if they wished to 
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continue the experiment prior to each training session and were informed that they could end 
their participation at any time. Twenty-one students were not included in the analysis due to not 
completing the entire three days of training and testing (N = 13), having taken part in previous 
cognitive training research (N = 2), or being too young to be included in the study (younger than 
6 years, N = 6). Of the 13 students who dropped out and were not too young or participants in 
previous cognitive training research, no more than 4 dropped out of any individual condition. 
One hundred seven students (average age = 10.65 years, SD = 2.36, range 6 – 14, 44% girls) 
were then included in the final analysis. Because students completed the tests, questionnaires, 
and training together as part of the camp, game versions were assigned randomly at the camp 
level to avoid children comparing the game and prizes amongst themselves and perhaps being 
disappointed when some received prizes or played more engaging games than others.  Running 
the experiment within summer camps enabled us to evaluate motivational features in a real-
world environment, however, one trade-off of this approach is that group sizes and ages differed 
somewhat depending on which camp students were recruited from. The demographic 



















Condition N Age (years) Grade  
All optional features included 25 11.28, SD 2.82 6.00, SD 2.38 
No theme change 13 10.92, SD 1.71 5.77, SD 1.54 
No Points Shown 19 12.21, SD 2.20 6.84, SD 1.64 
No Prizes 15 8.40, SD 2.03 3.33, SD 1.63 
No Explanation of Lives/Levels 11 9.82, SD 1.72 5.00, SD 1.61 
No Explanation of Lives/Levels or Certificates 12 10.83, SD .835 5.42; SD 0.52 
No Optional Features Included 12 10.00, SD 1.86 4.83, SD 1.64 
 
Protocol. A pre-test was administered on the first day of the experiment prior to the 
training. The pre-test consisted of a computerized object 2-back assessment that presented 
participants with a sequence of images one at a time. Participants were required to determine 
whether each item matched the one presented two items previously and then press one of two 
keys to indicate their answer. An object was presented every 3 seconds, with a presentation time 
of 500ms and an inter-stimulus interval of 2,500ms. The pre-test consisted of three blocks of 17 
stimuli each and performance was measured as the proportion of correct answers minus the 
proportion of false responses. Each block included five target trials and ten non-target trials after 
the presentation of the initial two stimuli. Ten practice trials were included prior to the actual 
assessment to ensure that the children understood how to complete the task. Following the pre-
test on the first day of the study, students began training with the n-back working memory game. 
After the training on each day, experimenters orally administered brief surveys with Likert-type 
questions asking how much students enjoyed the game, how exciting the game was, how difficult 
the game was, and how much effort each student had put into the game. These four questions 
were adapted for a previous cognitive training study from a factor analysis of the Intrinsic 
Motivation Inventory (Jaeggi et al., 2011; McAuley, Duncan, & Tammen, 1989). Each of these 
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variables was averaged over the course of three-days to create enjoyment, excitement, effort, and 
difficulty variables. Researchers also rated students on how engaged they seemed during each 
day of training using a Likert-type scale following each training session; this was also averaged 
over the course of the three days to create a final observer engagement score for each participant. 






Figure 3.1. Object 2-back task 
 
 
Cognitive Training Game. Participants trained on a game-like computerized working 
memory task similar to that used in a previous study with children (Jaeggi et al., 2011). This 
spatial n-back task presented participants with stimuli at one of six locations on the screen, at a 
rate of 3 seconds each, with 2,500ms between stimuli and with each stimulus presented for 
500ms. Students were required to press the A key each time the current stimulus matched the 
location of the one presented n items previously, and the L key each time the current stimulus did 
not match. Participants completed 10 rounds of this task each day, each round consisting of 15 + 
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n trials, and each round consisting of 5 targets and 10+n non-targets. All versions of the game 
were adaptive in that the n level was adjusted depending on performance in each round. If a 
participant made four or more errors they would lose a single life; after losing three “lives” the 
participant’s n-level would be decreased by 1 in the following round. If a participant made three 
or less errors n increased by 1 in the following round. 
Seven versions of the n-back training game were developed to examine the role of five 
motivational features: points, theming, explanation of lives and levels, prizes, and end-of-session 
certificates. One version of the game included all of these motivation features, while another 
included none of them.  Four of the other versions excluded one of these features. Due to 
experimenter error, one additional version that was meant to exclude the certificates provided to 
players at the end of each session also excluded the display of lives and levels feature. However, 
because this group (with two interrelated elements) was of potential interest, it was included in 
the subsequent analysis. 
Theming. Several different themes were developed to make the n-back task more 
appealing to students, that is, a frog jumping on lily pads, a cat appearing in windows of a 
haunted house, and a monkey jumping from sail to sail on a pirate ship (Figure 3.2). In all game 
versions except for the one excluding theming, the theme changed before the first round on the 
2nd and 3rd day of training. In the “no theme” group as well as the “no motivational features” 
group, only the lily pad theme was included, and this theme remained persistent across the three 






Figure 3.2. Game elements 
 
 
Score. A bar on the bottom of the screen displayed the score as the player completed the 
n-back task. Points were earned for correctly identifying whether the location of the character on 
the screen matched the location presented n instances earlier. In versions of the game with prizes, 
players were instructed that they could trade in points earned for a prize at the end of each day. 
In the “no points” and “no motivational features” versions of the game, the persistent score was 
hidden during play (Figure 3.2). The score was still shown at the end of each round, however. 
No display or explanation of lives or levels. Lives left and the current level were 
displayed on-screen during play. “Levels” indicated the n level the user was currently on, while 
“Lives” was used to indicate how many errors the participant could make before dropping an n-
back level on the subsequent round. The “Lives” and “Levels” indicator were hidden on the 
bottom bar (Figure 3.2) for the “no lives or levels explanation” group, as well as the “no 
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motivational features” group. Additionally, in these groups the experimenter did not mention 
lives and levels. The game remained adaptive as in the other conditions, however, and the 
participants still received a certificate after each day’s training summarizing performance. 
Prizes. Prizes were offered each day after the completion of the game in exchange for 
“points” the participants had earned. In the “no prizes” group and the “no motivational features” 
group, participants were given a prize at the very end of the study, but not each day during 
training. Additionally, participants in those groups were not told that prizes would be given prior 
to completing the post-test on day three. In the groups where prizes were present, students were 
allowed to see a treasure box (Figure 3.2) from which they would select items at the end of each 
day. 
End of session certificates and no display or explanation of lives and levels. Players were 
awarded a certificate (Figure 3.2) at the end of each training day celebrating the level they 
reached. In the “no certificate” version of the game, players were supposed to complete the 
standard version of the task but without a certificate given at the end of the round, however, the 
experimenters for this group incorrectly administered a version of the game without the display 
of lives or levels. Thus players in one of the seven groups were not aware of the role of lives or 
levels during the task, and additionally did not receive certificates at the end of each day 
Results 
Outlier Analysis. Outliers in the data were evaluated by examining the average training 
performance across all 3 sessions for each participant. Using a criterion of 2 SD, we identified 
two high-performing outliers who trained at an average n-back level of above 4, and two low-
performing outliers who performed below at an n-back level of 1.3 or below. However, the 
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exclusion of these outliers did not impact the outcome of the analyses detailed below, and thus 
they were not removed from the results described here. 
To identify differences in motivation, training performance over time, and pre/post-test 
performance on the object n-back measure, omnibus ANCOVAs were conducted with all game 
conditions included; in the case of a significant effect of game-type on these variables, follow-up 
ANCOVAs were conducted comparing each game variant to the original version with all 
features included. Despite attempts to recruit summer camps with similar ages, there were 
significant differences in age across some of the training groups F(6,100) = 5.46, p < .001, η2 p = 
.247. Age predicted improvement in the training following a regression analysis including the 
age of the pooled participants as predictor and the rate of improvement (operationalized as the 
slope of a linear model – see also below) of the task as outcome, β= -.202, t(105) = -2.108, p 
<.05, R2 = .041 (proportion of variance in slope explained F(1,105) = 4.444, p = .037). Thus, we 
included age as a covariate in our subsequent analysis.  
 
 
Figure 3.3. Average game performance (n-back level) across all individuals on each day. Error 







Figure 3.4. Average game performance (n-back level) at baseline for each game version. Error 
bars represent standard error. 
 
 
Training performance. To quantify each participant’s training improvement over the 
three sessions of training, the slope of a linear regression model was calculated for each 
participant using the average n-back level per day of training. Due to the difference in ages 
across conditions (Table 3.1) and the variance in baseline performance across game versions 
(Figure 3.4), we included age and starting n-back level as covariates in our analyses. A univariate 
ANCOVA across conditions revealed a significant effect of game-version on training 
improvement as measured by linear slope F(6,98) = 2.49 , p = .028, η2 p = .132).  
To analyze the effect of each individual motivational feature on performance, we then 
computed a set of univariate ANCOVAs with training slope as the dependent variable, calculated 
from the average n-back on each day of the training task. We compared students playing the 
59 
 
version of the game with the full set of motivational features to students playing each of the other 
versions with elements removed, see Table 3.2 and Figure 3.5. Students who played the version 
of the game without the persistent display of score performed significantly better at the training 
task over time versus students who played the version of the game with all motivational features, 
F(1,40) = 7.22, p=.010, η2 p = .153) as did students who completed the version of the game 
without the indication of lives or levels, F(1, 32) = 4.48, p=.042, η2 p = .123. However, students 
in the group without theme changes did not perform significantly different from the group with 
all motivational features F(1, 34) = .07, p=.801, η2 p = .002), nor did the group that did not 
receive prizes after each training session F(1, 36) = .01, p=.932, η2 p = .000).  The group that did 
not receive certificates after each day, and also did not see lives or level information during 
gameplay, trended worse than the all motivational features group, but not significantly so, 
F(1,33) = 2.60, p = .116, η2 p = .073. The group that completed the version with no motivational 
features trended higher but did not differ significantly in performance on the training task from 
the group with all features, F(1, 33) = 2.00, p=.167, η2 p = .057). However, we note that multiple 
comparisons are a serious limitation here: a Bonferroni correction for these analyses would 
require a p value of .0083 or below; none of the results above would survive that correction 
(although the points versus all motivational features version would come close).  
 Thus, an additional analysis was performed to further examine the most robust finding, 
that the display of points on screen may have had a deleterious effect on game performance, as 
well as to partially address the issue of small samples sizes in the study. A final univariate 
ANCOVA was thus conducted in a similar manner as above with both the group without any 
motivational features and the group with only the score removed (N = 31) compared to all other 
participants (N = 75, all of whom played a version of the game where points were displayed). 
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This analysis further supported the original finding, as the combined task performance of all 
individuals who did not see points displayed was significantly better than the combined 
performance of all individuals who did have points displayed F(1,103) = 7.937, p = .006, η2 p = 
.072. A Bayesian follow-up analysis provided moderate confirmation of this primary result with 
BF10 = 3.899 for the model with the points displayed factor and age as a covariate. 
 












Figure 3.5. Adjusted means of training slope by game-type controlling for age and baseline n-
back level. Means are estimated at age = 10.65 and baseline n-back = 2.49. Error bars represent 






Motivation. Participant self-ratings of task-related enjoyment, difficulty, effort and 
excitement were averaged over the three days and examined as a function of game variant. 
ANCOVAs with game-type as the independent variable and age as a covariate did not find a 
significant effect of game-type on student self-report of enjoyment, F(6,98) = 1.52, p = .180, η2 p 
= .084, excitement, F(6,98) = 1.43, p =.188, η2 p = .080, or effort, F(6,98) = 1.35, p=.241, η
2
 p  = 
.076, or student self-report of difficulty, F(6,98) = 1.94, p=.082, η2 p = .105. However, as in other 
studies of motivational factors in differently aged students (Lepper, Henderlong-Corpus, & 
Iyengar, 2005), a median split of students by age revealed that students 10 and under (N=47, 
mean = 3.75, SD = .79) were significantly more excited to complete the task than students 11 
and older (N=60, mean = 3.29, SD = .72) to complete the task (F(1,103) = 9.78, p = .002, η2 p = 
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.085). On self-ratings of enjoyment, younger students (N=47, mean = 3.89, SD = .54) were also 
more likely than older students (N=60, mean = 3.57, SD = .67) to enjoy the task, F(1, 103) = 
7.38, p = .008, η2 p = .066, suggesting at least that the student questionnaires did accurately 
capture their personal feelings regarding engagement with the game. Additional analyses of 
motivational factors for the combined game versions without the display of points compared to 
the game versions with points on screen did not identify a significant impact of this feature on 
any of the motivational factors, although students in the group that did not see a persistent score 
reported applying marginally less effort during gameplay (N = 31, M = 3.76, SD = .55) than 
those who did see a score (N = 75, M = 3.48, SD = .67), F(1,103) = 3.901, p = .051, η2 p = .036. 
Averaged observer ratings of player engagement over the three-days were also examined as a 
function of game variant. Again, an ANCOVA was conducted including researcher engagement 
ratings as the dependent variable, game-type as the independent variable, and age as a covariate. 
Game-type did not significantly predict experimenter ratings of engagement, F(6,99) = 1.91, p = 
.086, η2 p = .104.  
Object n-back transfer task. Finally, performance on the object 2-back near-transfer 
task was examined through an ANCOVA with gain on the object n-back test as the dependent 
variable, game type as the independent variable, and age and pre-test performance on the object 
2-back task as covariates. No differences in improvement were identified between any of the 
game variants, F(6,98) = 1.54, p = .175, η2 p = .086. There was a marginal effect of having score 
displayed when all individuals who played a version without persistent scoring (N = 31, mean 
object n-back gain = .06, SD = .21) were compared to the combined participants training with a 
version with persistent score (N = 75, mean object n-back gain = .02, SD = .29), F(1,103) = 
3.070, p = .083, η2 p 
 = .029. This is not surprising, however, as the training regimen was likely 
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too short for sizable near-transfer effects to occur. The untrained object n-back task performance 
across all participants was not significantly higher after only three days of training (M = .473, SD 
= .258) than at the start (M = .443, SD = .221), as revealed through a paired-samples t-test, 
t(106) = 1.14, p = .255.  
Discussion 
The results of this research should add nuance to our understanding of how popular 
“motivational” game features impact actual player performance. Over the three days of the study, 
students playing versions of the game without the persistent display of points and without the 
display of lives or levels improved significantly more on the game task than students using the 
original version of the game with all features present. Students playing game versions without 
changing theme, daily prizes, or end-of-session certificates and the display of lives and levels did 
not perform significantly differently than the comparison group. Game version did not 
significantly influence student motivation or performance on the object n-back task.  
The effect of these game elements on training performance may seem counterintuitive at 
first. Why did only the “no score displayed” and “no lives or levels displayed” groups perform 
differently than the group with all features? And why was the removal of these motivational 
features associated with improved performance on the training task over the three sessions? It is 
worth noting that score and lives and levels were indicated on a persistent bar near the game 
space, a common feature in games. It is quite possible that any element that distracted the user 
from the challenging n-back task during the actual game would reduce performance, and 
furthermore, that it might negatively impact learning (i.e., the rate of improvement) over the 
course of training. This is an interesting finding in light of the fact that cognitive training -- and 
learning games in general -- often include elements such as score or lives prominently in the 
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game space. In light of this, one outstanding question is why the group without any motivational 
features did not perform significantly better than the group with all motivational features 
included. It is possible that although the no motivational features group did have fewer 
distracting elements, the exclusion of all other, non-distracting elements had a combined 
deleterious effect on performance. Determining whether there is a “happy medium” of 
motivational features that result in optimized performance is a worthwhile goal for future 
research. Additionally, the other motivational elements, such as awarding prizes and theme 
changes, did not occur during core gameplay. Over the longer term these elements may impact 
performance differently, but this finding provides some evidence for removing motivational 
elements that may be distracting from the player in the early days of a cognitive training 
regimen.  
Overall, the lack of an effect of game variant on student self-ratings of motivation and 
performance on the untrained object n-back task is not necessarily surprising. Each version of the 
training program still appeared game-like, and the removal of any individual feature may have a 
minimal effect on motivation. Alternatively, it may be that certain features that are commonly 
believed to be “motivational” in nature – such as the display of score – might not actual improve 
engagement, at least in certain circumstances. Regardless of the underlying reason, this suggests 
that cognitive game designers may be able to remove some of the game elements that were found 
to be distracting without any negative impact on a player’s own perceptions of enjoyment and 
excitement. Finally, it is not necessarily surprising that only the training improvements and not 
performance on the object n-back task was affected by condition within the limited three-day 
scope of the study. It is possible that, in an experiment utilizing a much longer training 
experience, differences in transfer might have been observed. 
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 Several limitations inherent to the present study should be considered. Perhaps of greatest 
concern is the limited sample size and significant age differences across some of the conditions. 
While some of the groups are adequately powered, others, due to dropout or other extenuating 
factors, have as few as 11 participants. Age was included as a covariate in the analyses, but the 
small sample sizes mean that it is difficult to fully account for the influence of age on differences 
in training performance. Because these findings would not have survived multiple comparisons, 
and the effect sizes found were fairly small, these findings must necessarily be seen as 
preliminary, and, while informative of future research, not conclusive.  
Additionally, this is not a true randomized controlled study -- while camps were assigned 
to conditions randomly, all participants within each camp trained on the same variant of the 
game. Both of these factors are tradeoffs resulting from the real-world nature of the study; 
students trained amongst their peers in an actual school environment. Finally, some features of 
the training regimen, such as the illustrative art style and display of score at the end of each 
round, exist in all versions of the game. These other features may impact student performance 
and engagement as well, and were not examined here. The fact that some of the more subtle 
motivational features, such as persistent score, had a significant impact on three-day performance 
improvements indicates that these other features should be a focus of future research. As 
mentioned in the introduction, one further consideration is the possibility that certain game 
elements may interact with each other and that this may influence participant engagement or 
performance on the training task. For example, it is possible that persistent scoring is more 
motivating when participants receive prizes based on their score at the end of each day. This is 
potentially a significant issue, and one that is not examined in the present study. 
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Besides including additional game variants, future research could also focus on the 
impact of these motivational features over a longer-term training regimen. It is possible that 
some features that impede performance on the training task in this study have less of an effect in 
a longer training regimen. However, given evidence that long-term improvement in the training 
task is necessary for transfer gains, any feature that impacts training performance is worth 
special consideration (Jaeggi et al., 2011). Considering the fact that persistent scoring and the 
lives/levels feature did impact training performance, we recommend that developers of cognitive 
training exercise discretion when incorporating these features into their programs. 
 Our findings have broad implications not only for developers of cognitive training but 
game designers and cognitive psychologists more generally. Psychologists often make tasks 
game-like in an effort to drive user engagement.  Likewise, within education there has recently 
been a movement towards game-like formative assessment to evaluate student performance 
(Wang, 2008). Our findings suggest that game-like elements should be added with caution. 
Adding game features to an already stressful testing situation may have a deleterious impact on 
student performance, particularly if the game features add irrelevant cognitive demands. Even 
seemingly innocuous features, such as displaying score or giving players a certain number of 
“lives,” may impact performance in a negative fashion. This does not mean that games cannot be 
effective teaching tools, instruments for cognitive training, or assessment mechanisms. On the 
contrary, this research provides further support for carefully matching game mechanics and 
features with the actual task. Researchers might take a look at venerable computerized training 
task, such as Space Fortress, and examine the impact that non-essential game-like elements 
included in those tasks have on performance.  
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While some research has supported the inclusion of game-like elements in cognitive 
training to improve motivation and training performance (Prins et al., 2011), our findings suggest 
that these features should be chosen judiciously. Combined with the results from Hawkins et al. 
(2013), our data suggest that game-like features may not improve the data one collects in 
research. Furthermore, distracting features may actually impair the participant’s ability to 
improve quickly at the task. Certain “motivational” elements may at best be unnecessary for 
driving learning on the core task, and at worst have an effect counter to what is intended by the 
designer. Mae West may have said “the score never interested me, only the game,” but persistent 
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  The goal of cognitive training is to improve a single cognitive skill, or a set of skills, that 
would then increase performance across a wide range of untrained tasks that draw on those skills. 
As discussed earlier, however, outcomes from cognitive training studies are often mixed. It is 
common for only some individuals to benefit from the intervention, and it is largely unknown 
what individual-difference factors play a role in the success of these interventions. Thus, the 
determination of which factors moderate task-based improvements and transfer following 
cognitive training, and by how much, is an important question. While a wide variety of factors, 
such as the degree of researcher involvement, subject setting, training duration, and feedback to 
participants have been proposed as potential moderators of improvements (Jaeggi et al., 2014), 
motivational orientation has been shown to be an important factor in determining the success of 
cognitive interventions and learning more generally (Pintrich, 1999). This has only recently been 
explored in the context of cognitive training research (Prins, 2011), however. The goal of the 
present study is to investigate the impact of monetary compensation and motivation on the 
outcome of one widely used cognitive training intervention: working memory (WM) training.  
One potential explanation for differences in outcomes across studies is monetary 
compensation, which may impact one’s motivation to complete a task (Murayama et al., 2010). 
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Many WM training studies have utilized the dual n-back task, which requires participants to 
judge whether items presented in an auditory stream are the same as those presented n-items 
previously and simultaneously judge whether locations presented in a spatial stream are the same 
as those presented n-items previously. As participants succeed at a particular n-level, n is 
incrementally increased. Training on this difficult, adaptive WM task was found in one 
prominent study to lead to improvements in a measure of fluid intelligence (Gf; Jaeggi et al., 
2008). This and other similar n-back training paradigms have subsequently been used by several 
research teams, and while some studies have also found transfer to Gf or related visuospatial 
reasoning measures (Colom et al., 2013; Jaeggi et al., 2011; Jaeggi et al., 2014; Jausovec & 
Jausovec, 2012; Rudebeck et al., 2012; Schweizer et al., 2011; Stephenson & Halpern, 2013), 
other studies have not replicated these transfer effects (Chooi & Thompson, 2012; Redick et al., 
2013; Thompson et al., 2013).  
We propose that for working memory training, as in a wide range of learning tasks, the 
degree to which individuals are intrinsically motivated will have a substantial impact on learning, 
performance, and achievement (Benware & Deci, 1984; Condry & Chambers, 1978; Lin et al., 
2001; Spence & Helmreich, 1983). Participants who lack intrinsic motivation are less attentive 
and more distractible (Fransson, 1977), do not maximize effort (Vollmeyer & Rheinberg, 2000), 
and are more likely to disengage when a task becomes difficult (Dev, 1997). There is evidence 
that extrinsic reward may have a deleterious effect on compliance in completing repetitive 
cognitive tasks (Murayama et al., 2010) as well as reducing performance on attentional measures 
(Robinson et al., 2012). Additionally, the existence of extrinsic motivators, such as payment for 
participation, may undermine intrinsic motivation in a wide range of contexts (Blumenfeld, 
Kempler, & Krajcik, 2006; Henderlong & Lepper, 2002; Pittman & Heller, 1987; Tang & Hall, 
72 
 
1995). However, evidence in support of the hypothesis that extrinsic rewards undermine 
performance is mixed. While a meta-analysis by Deci, Koestner, & Ryan (1999) did identify a 
negative impact to self-determination and therefore intrinsic motivation, another meta-analysis 
by Cameron & Pierce (1994) found inconsistent effects of extrinsic reward on intrinsic 
motivation. Furthermore, individual differences may moderate the degree to which extrinsic 
factors may be undermining. For example, Robinson et al. (2012) suggest that individuals who 
express very high intrinsic motivation may be less susceptible to the negative effects of 
providing an extrinsic reward. Finally, not all extrinsic rewards are alike: nominal extrinsic 
rewards, such as a small trinket or cash prize of only a few dollars, may not negatively impact 
intrinsic motivation (Ross, 1975). Additionally, only tangible rewards, such as money or physical 
prizes, have been shown to consistently undermine intrinsic motivation (Deci, 1971, 1972; Reeve 
& Deci, 1996; Swann & Pittman, 1977).  
Given that the impact of extrinsic rewards is complex and dependent on a variety of 
factors, including individual differences, the type of extrinsic reward, and the type of task, it may 
be valuable to consider the influence of extrinsic rewards in the context of WM training and its 
efficacy on transfer. In other fields, such as exercise compliance, some research suggests that 
receiving extrinsic rewards may reduce one’s intrinsic motivation to adhere to a training regimen 
(Frederick & Ryan, 1995). Because WM training studies are often time-intensive and 
challenging for participants, researchers frequently provide substantial payment. More than $100 
has been provided to participants in many of these studies as a means of recruitment (Anguera et 
al., 2012; Kundu et al., 2013; Redick et al., 2013; Rudebeck et al., 2012; Schweizer et al., 2011; 
Thompson et al., 2013). Other studies have provided nominal or no payment to subjects for their 
participation (Jaeggi et al., 2008; Jaeggi et al., 2010; Jaeggi et al., 2014; Jausovec & Jausovec, 
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2012; Stepankova et al., in press; Stephenson & Halpern, 2013). Compensation in these studies is 
often contingent simply on compliance or on a per-session basis (Redick et al., 2013); as 
discussed in the review of the motivation literature above, some have suggested that this 
compensation method may negatively impact intrinsic motivation, and thus performance on the 
tasks and assessments (Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 1999). One recent meta-analysis of dual n-back 
training research provides some evidence that compensation may be negatively correlated with 
transfer gains, although this effect did not survive the removal of outliers (Au et al., 2014). Of 
course, these WM training studies also differ on other dimensions as well, and it remains 
difficult to determine why some of these studies demonstrated transfer following cognitive 
training and others did not. Nevertheless, it is conceivable that the amount of payment might be 
an important factor that contributes to the magnitude of transfer. Thus, in the current study we 
directly manipulate the effect of extrinsic motivation on training and transfer outcomes through 
the use of compensated and uncompensated groups. 
As discussed earlier, there are likely individual differences in the extent to which 
extrinsic motivators might reduce intrinsic motivation. Consider an individual who is highly 
intrinsically motivated by a particular task (e.g. an academic who enjoys conducting his or her 
research). Compensation for those individuals may not necessarily undermine intrinsic 
motivation. Amabile et al. (1994) and Durik & Harackiewicz (2007) suggest that individual 
differences in motivational orientation may determine whether or not extrinsic reward has an 
undermining effect. Beyond the effects on task compliance and intrinsic motivation itself, some 
research on motivation has found that under some conditions, such as during an experimental 
session rather than in a participant’s free-time, extrinsic motivation may not have a detrimental 
effect on participant performance, and may even be beneficial (Wiersma, 1992). We predicted 
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that participants who report being intrinsically motivated despite being compensated should 
perform as well as those who participated on the basis of intrinsic motivation alone. We directly 
asked participants in the compensated group why they participated in the study as a final 
question following post-testing, and categorized their responses based on whether or not they 
mentioned improving cognition as a reason for joining the study. This stated interest in 
improving cognition may serve as a proxy for intrinsic motivation. 
Personal beliefs and personality factors, such as neuroticism and conscientiousness, have 
also been found to be linked to motivation as well as training performance (Judge & Ilies, 2002; 
Studer-Luethi et al., 2012). There is some evidence that transfer improvements following 
cognitive training may be a result of placebo effects rather than a function of some core cognitive 
ability being increased. In a study by Foroughi and colleagues (2016), participants were recruited 
by responding to one of two flyers: one that emphasized improvements to IQ, and another that 
focused on receiving subject pool credits. Participants in the group that viewed IQ-focused flyers 
had higher scores on the Theories of Intelligence scale at baseline, and also performed better than 
the non-IQ recruited group on two matrices-based tests following a single training session. 
Although this study included only a single session of training, another study by Jaeggi et al. 
(2014) found a similar association between incremental theories of intelligence and the amount 
of improvement on a visuospatial reasoning factor following training. This effect was driven 
principally by the active control group, suggesting the existence of a placebo effect. In that study, 
the impact of training on transfer remained significant after controlling for beliefs about 
intelligence; however, it is possible that self-theories about cognition and development may 
significantly impact performance, at least in some instances (Dweck & Master, 2008). Because 
we have included the same questionnaires assessing motivation as in Jaeggi et al. (2014), we can 
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assess how these factors might interact with the effects of monetary compensation. For example, 
trait factors such as those measured by the Cognitive Failures Questionnaire may impact a 
subject’s motivation to participate, as individuals with greater numbers of reported cognitive 
failures may be self-motivated to improve through the training. Conditions such as this may play 
a role in determining whether extrinsic motivation negatively affects training performance and 
transfer. 
Thus the primary goal of the present study was to test the effect of extrinsic motivation 
on training outcomes. Thus we recruited individuals to participate in a well-paid study ($352) for 
approximately 12 hours of combined testing and cognitive training. Neither the recruitment flyer 
nor initial screening for this group included any “brain training” or cognitive improvement 
messaging. This amount of compensation is identical to that used in Redick et al.’s (2013) study, 
a non-replication of Jaeggi et al.’s original dual n-back research (2008). We compared the 
effectiveness of training and transfer in this new compensated group to a group of 
uncompensated individuals recruited for another recent study of cognitive training and individual 
differences (Jaeggi et al., 2014) that was identical across all methodological features (training 
task, transfer tasks, experimental conditions) except for compensation and recruitment. In Jaeggi 
et al. (2014), participants were recruited to participate in a study of brain training and there was 
no compensation provided. We predicted that participants who were recruited to the current paid 
study would be less intrinsically motivated to engage in training, and consequentially, they 
would show reduced training and transfer effects compared to those who were recruited for a 








Participants. Forty-six participants were recruited for the current study from the Ann 
Arbor, Michigan community (mean age: 21.39 years; SD: 3.13; range: 18-30; 24 women). The 
participants were recruited to participate in a paid study (as opposed to a “cognitive training’ or 
“brain training” study) to complete a set of computerized tasks and were compensated $352 to 
complete the study. Two participants were excluded before finishing the pre-test due to technical 
problems, and one participant was asked to leave the study following two sessions of training 
after remembering that he had participated in cognitive training research previously (participants 
were screened during recruitment to ensure they had not participated in WM training research 
before). Of the remaining 43 individuals, 1 participant withdrew from the study after completing 
no more than 3 sessions of training. Another 6 participants dropped out at some point during the 
training and/or failed to complete the post-test, after having trained for 10.83 sessions on average 
(SD: 6.27; range 4-20). The final group of participants who completed pre- and post-testing and 
a minimum of 17 training sessions consisted of 36 individuals (mean age: 21.03 years; SD: 3.05; 
range: 18-30; 21 women).  
We compared training and transfer performance of this paid group of participants to data 
originally published in Jaeggi et al. (2014). The Jaeggi et al. participants were recruited from the 
Ann Arbor community to participate in an experiment advertised as a “Brain Training Study” 
without the offer of compensation or class credit. Included in the current analysis are two of the 
three conditions from that study: an unpaid dual n-back group and an unpaid active control 
group. Specifically, we included data from the 52 participants in those two conditions who 
completed at least 17 sessions of training (mean age: 24.58 years; SD: 5.72; range: 18-43; 28 
women; see Table 4.1 for detailed information on recruitment and dropouts). Three participants 
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from the earlier groups failed to complete a single questionnaire each and two participants failed 
to complete a single assessment each, these participants were included in all portions of the 
analysis except those involving those assessments or questionnaires. There were no significant 
demographic differences between the final sample of paid and unpaid participants except that 
unpaid participants were significantly older than paid participants, F(1,86) = 11.559, p = .001, 
ηp^2 = .118). It is possible that the compensation may have contributed to this age difference; 
however, a linear regression analysis revealed that age was unrelated to training or transfer 
outcomes. Sample sizes in this study are slightly larger but comparable to the groups used in 
Redick et al. (2013), both for the purposes of comparison and achieving adequate statistical 
power.  
 
Table 4.1. Attrition rates for all individuals who completed at least 3 sessions of training. 
 Completed Training Dropped Out 
 N Sessions N  Sessions 
 









(Percentage) (SD; range) 58% 1.08; 17-22 42% 5.45; 5-20 
 




















(Percentage) (SD; range) 75% .58; 18-21 25% 7.76; 4-20 
 
 
Recruitment. To recruit participants for this study, we posted flyers throughout the Ann 
Arbor area. The flyers used to recruit participants for this study were different from those used to 
recruit participants in the Jaeggi et al. (2014) study. Both flyers are included in Figure 4.1. The 
paid cohort was offered compensation in a manner comparable to previous paid training studies, 
particularly Redick et al. (2013). Participants were offered $72 for completing the 3-hour pre-test 
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session, $10 for each training session completed, and an additional $72 for completing the 3-hour 
post-test session. Participants were paid following the post-test or after dropping out of the study. 
The paid condition data was collected one academic year after the data from Jaeggi et al. (2014) 
were collected. However, to mitigate the potential cohort effects between the different conditions, 
flyers recruiting participants were placed in identical locations to Jaeggi et al. (2014) and all testing 
materials and protocols were kept identical. Besides the recruitment flyer and payment, the only 
difference in protocol between the two studies was a final manipulation-check question 
administered to the paid condition after all other post-testing was completed. In both studies, the 
only mention of improving cognition between recruitment and the debriefing was a single sentence 
in the consent form: “The ultimate goal of this research study is to better understand how we can 
improve cognitive functions by means of a computerized training intervention.”  
 
 
Figure 4.1. Recruitment posters used for the paid and unpaid groups. 
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Procedure. Participants in the paid dual n-back group underwent the identical procedure 
and completed the same battery of tasks as in the Jaeggi et al. (2014) study. Following written 
informed consent, participants completed an initial baseline assessment session, consisting of 
five reasoning tasks (see below) administered in the following order: Inferences, Surface 
Development, Verbal Analogies, APM, Culture Fair Intelligence Test (CFT). This testing session 
lasted approximately 90 minutes. Due to the length and intensity of these testing sessions, 
participants were allowed to take breaks between successive assessments if they wished. In the 
second session, the remaining assessments were administered in the following order: Space 
Relations, Reading Comprehension, Form Board, Digit Symbol, Bochumer Matrizen-Test 
(BOMAT). This second pre-test session lasted approximately 90 minutes as well. Participants 
were also asked to complete questionnaires administered via computer between the first and 
second session (Need for Cognition (NFC), Theories of Cognitive Abilities (TOCA), Cognitive 
Failures Questionnaire – Memory and Attention Lapses (CFQ), Personality Questionnaire). 
After having completed all assessments described above, participants in the paid dual n-back 
group (and unpaid dual n-back group in Jaeggi et al. (2014)) were instructed on the dual n-back 
training task. Similarly, participants in the knowledge-training group (active control group) 
received training on their training task. All participants were instructed to train once a day and at 
least five times a week for a total of 20 sessions; in fact, all participants in the paid dual n-back 
group completed the full 20 sessions (this was not the case in the unpaid study). In order to 
increase and monitor compliance, participants were asked to email their training data files to the 
experimenters each day. Reminder emails were sent if participants failed to do so. After 
completing up to 20 sessions of training, participants completed two post-test sessions in a 
similar manner as for the pre-test, with the notable exception that they worked through the 
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alternate version of the assessment for counterbalancing purposes. A/B versions of tests were 
counterbalanced across participants, and parallel-test versions were used in order to avoid 
participants encountering the same items twice. 
Following completion of the post-test, participants in the paid dual n-back group were 
asked an additional manipulation-check question regarding their reasons for signing up for the 
experiment. These responses were coded for whether or not they included a mention of extrinsic 
motivation only (compensation) or whether they also included some mention of intrinsic 
motivation, such as improving cognition. Inter-rater reliability across three researchers was high 
(Krippendorff’s alpha reliability = .82, N decisions = 108). Twenty-one (58%) participants 
mentioned only extrinsic motivation, while 15 (42%) participants mentioned some intrinsic 
motivation for joining the experiment. We note that the participants who mentioned intrinsic 
motivation did so despite the sign-up and recruitment for the study including no mention of 
personal improvement. This suggests that these participants developed this intrinsic motivation 
after deciding to join the study.  
Transfer Measures. AFOQT Reading Comprehension Test (Air Force Officer 
Qualifying Test; Berger, Gupta, Berger & Skinner, 1990 as used in; Kane et al., 2004; Kane & 
Miyake, 2007). Participants completed ten items per test version within a five-minute time limit. 
Each item requires participants to read a short paragraph and then choose one of five possible 
answers that will complete the final sentence of the paragraph. Score was total items correct. 
ETS Inferences Test (Ekstrom et al., 1976; cf. Kane et al., 2004). Participants were given 
six minutes to answer ten items (either the odd or even items from the original ETS assessment). 
Each individual item consists of one to two short sentences and five possible conclusions. 
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Participants must determine which conclusion can be determined from the statement without 
needing additional information.  
Verbal Analogies Test (based on Kane et al., 2004; Wright, Thompson, Ganis, 
Newcombe, & Kosslyn, 2008). This computerized assessment requires participants to view two 
sets of word pairs and determine whether a word pair presented on the left side of the screen is 
the same (by pressing the 1 key) or different (by pressing the 0 key) from the word pair presented 
on the right side. The relationship between words in a pair consisted of a synonym, category, 
function, opposite, or linear order. Participants must respond to each trial within 8 seconds, 
although the task itself was self-paced. A 500ms black screen was presented between trials. Each 
participant completed a total of 57 distinct trials after 8 practice trials. Score was recorded as the 
proportion of items solved correctly. 
Bochumer Matrizen Test (BOMAT; Hossiep, Turck, & Hasella, 1999). The BOMAT 
consists of a set of visual reasoning puzzles ordered in increasing difficulty and developed to be 
challenging for high-ability participants. Each puzzle is a 5x3 matrix with a single missing 
section. Participants must review 6 possible answers to complete the matrix and choose the best 
option. Participants first complete 10 items for practice and then 27 items on the actual test 
drawn from the long (80 item) version of the assessment. The score was the number of correct 
items minus the first of the 27 test items; this initial item was considered additional practice. No 
time restriction was used in this task. 
Cattell’s Culture Fair Test (CFT; Cattell & Cattell, 1963). The present experiment 
utilized Scale 3 Forms A and B, which included 22 practice items plus 100 test items total. Each 
version consists of four subtests. The tasks on the subtests include series, classification, matrices, 
and conditions (topology) (cf. Johnson, Nijenhuis, & Bouchard, 2008). Using the combined 
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items from Forms A and B, three versions of the assessment with an equal number of items from 
each subtest (8-10) were created. Participants completed 2-3 practice items for each subtest and 
then solved the remaining 34 items without time constraints. Score was recorded as the total 
number of correct answers. 
DAT Space Relations (Bennett, Seashore, & Wesman, 1972; cf. Kane et al., 2004). Each 
item of the DAT consists of the outline of a pattern that can be folded into a 3-D object. 
Participants then review four possible answers and choose the one object that can be folded from 
the outline shown. The original test was divided into odd (version A) and even (version B) items 
so that two versions were created with 17 items each (the last item from the original test was left 
out). A 5-minute time limit was used and the score consisted of the total number of items 
completed correctly during this time.  
ETS Form Board Test (Ekstrom et al., 1976; cf. Kane et al., 2004). For each item 
participants review a group of five 2-D shapes. Some or all of these shapes, when combined, 
create a 2-D shape shown at the top of the page. Participants mark a plus sign under the shapes 
that can be used to create the shape at the top of the page and a minus sign for those that should 
be left out. Each target shape includes six sets of five items below it, and each version of the test 
included four different figures: cross, square, triangle, pentagon. Version A of the assessment 
included items 1-6, 19-24, and 31-42 from the original test, while version B included items 7-18, 
25-30, and 43-49. Participants first complete 2 practice items and then are given 8 minutes to 
solve 24 test items, each consisting of 5 possible shapes, for a total of 120 answers. Total score 
was the number of correct answers given in the allotted time.  
ETS Surface Development Test (Ekstrom et al., 1976; cf. Kane et al., 2004). Participants 
are given a set of 2-D drawings that can be folded along dotted lines to create a 3-D shape. Some 
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of the edges of each drawing are marked with letters, and some with numbers. For each item 
participants must determine which of the edges with letters will match the edges with numbers. 
Each item includes five numbered edges, and each assessment includes six items, for a total of 
30 responses. After completing a practice item participants must complete the assessment in 6 
minutes. The odd items of the original test were used for version A, while version B was drawn 
from the even items. Score was the total number of correct items given during the time allotted. 
Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices (APM; Raven, 1990). Like the BOMAT, this 
test is composed of a set of visual reasoning problems ordered by level of challenge. Each item 
consists of a 3x3 matrix in which the tile in the lower right corner is missing. Participants must 
review 8 possible responses and choose the tile that successfully completes the empty slot. Set 1 
from the Raven’s assessment was completed as practice, and half the items on Set 2 were used 
for each of two versions of this test. No time limit was used for this assessment; however, the 
experimenters note that this factor, combined with the low number of items on the test, may 
cause potential ceiling effects and make measuring transfer more difficult. The score was the 
total number of correct responses. 
Digit Symbol Test. The Digit Symbol test from the WAIS (Wechsler, 1997) consists of 
the presentation of nine digit-symbol pairs. Participants must quickly examine each digit and 
then fill in the corresponding symbol under a list of 130 digits. Participants have 90 seconds to 
complete as many items as possible, and this total is used as the score. 
  Questionnaires. Need for Cognition (NFC; Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). This survey 
includes statements such as “I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to 
problems.” Participants were asked to indicate their level of agreement or disagreement on a 9-
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point Likert-type scale; the survey was then used to determine how much a subject enjoys 
cognitively difficult activities. 
Theories of Cognitive Abilities (TOCA; Dweck, 1999). We measured the extent to which 
participants think of intelligence as a fixed or changeable trait. The questionnaire consists of 8 
statements, such as “You have a certain amount of cognitive ability and you can’t really do much 
to change it.” Participants indicate their agreement or disagreement on a 6-point Likert-type 
scale. 
Cognitive Failure Questionnaire – Memory and Attention Lapses (CFQ-MAL as used in 
McVay & Kane, 2009). Participants’ proclivity for making cognitive errors was measured using 
a list of 40 questions, such as “Do you read something and find you haven’t been thinking about 
it, so you have to read it again?” Responses are given on a 5-point Likert-type scale. 
 Personality Inventory. Personality traits were measured using the Mini-Marker Set based 
on the Five-Factor Personality Model (Saucier, 1994). On this test, subjects indicated their level 
of agreement with 40 single adjective descriptors of personality on a 5-point Likert scale. In a 
previous study of n-back working memory training, neuroticism and conscientiousness both 
impacted the outcomes of the training; for example, participants training on the dual n-back task 
with low neuroticism displayed greater transfer than those with high neuroticism (Studer-Luethi, 
et al., 2012). 
Post Test Questionnaire. Following the post-test, participants were asked questions such 
as whether they enjoyed the training and if they believed the intervention improved their memory 
or attention. In the paid dual n-back group, an additional final question was included at the end 





Training Tasks. Dual N-back Task. The dual n-back working memory training task was 
identical to the one used in Jaeggi et al. (2014). In this task, participants processed two streams 
of stimuli (auditory and visuospatial; 8 stimuli per modality) that were synchronously presented 
at the rate of 3s per stimulus. Participants must continuously determine whether each successive 
item (auditory and visual) matches the item that came 1, 2, 3, or n-back before it. After each 
block of trials, the n level was varied as a function of performance. If participants made fewer 
than 3 errors in both modalities, the level of n increased in the next round by one, if they made 
more than 5 errors in either modality, the level of n decreased in the next round by one, and in all 
other cases, n remained the same. There were 6 targets per modality in each round. Participants 
trained for 15 rounds in each session, each round consisting of 20 + n trials. We examined the 
nature of the training function from two dual n-back cohorts used in this study and found that a 
logarithmic model, rather than a linear or exponential model, provided the best fit. Therefore a 
logarithmic model was used to calculate each individual’s training performance over the course 
of the intervention. 
Knowledge-Training Task. The knowledge training control task was identical to that used 
in Jaeggi et al. (2014). Participants completed GRE-style general knowledge, vocabulary, and 
trivia questions selected from a pool of approximately 5,000 questions. Each question was 
displayed in the center of the screen, and participants chose one of four answer alternatives 
presented below the question. After the participant’s response, the correct answer was provided, 
along with some additional facts related to the question. Incorrectly answered items were 
presented again in the beginning of the next session in order to evoke a learning experience. 
Users generally get many questions incorrect in the initial sessions of the task before consistently 
entering more correct answers in subsequent days of training. This sort of presentation is 
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responsible for a training curve that does not fit the logarithmic model used for the dual n-back 
task. 
A training session in either condition lasted approximately 20-30 minutes. After each 
session, participants rated how engaged they were during the session (responses were given on a 
Likert-type scale ranging from 1-9). At the end of each session participants were presented with 
a curve displaying their average N (one point for each session) in relation to a pre-set curve that 
was derived from previous data collected in our laboratory. 
Jaeggi et al. (2014) performed an exploratory factor analysis with an oblique rotation, 
utilizing pre-test measures from participants in their study and identified two factors that served 
as the basis of the current transfer analyses. The first factor, determined to be a verbal reasoning 
component, included four measures that accounted for 35% of the variance. These measures 
included the CFT, ETS Inferences, AFOQT Reading Comprehension, and Verbal Analogies. The 
second factor, inclusive of five measures, accounted for 13% of the variance. These measures 
included the APM, BOMAT, Form Board, Space Relations, and the Surface Development test. 
Because the Digit Symbol Test did not load on either of the factors, it was not included in the 
subsequent analysis. Composite scores (the mean of the standardized gains) were calculated for 
each factor. In the present study, because we had a small sample size, we utilized the same factor 
structure as Jaeggi et al. (2014). Pre- and post-test scores for each measure were divided by the 
standard deviation of the whole sample at pre-test for each measure and then averaged into their 
respective factors (cf. Jaeggi et al., 2014). For the transfer measures the current analysis utilized 
repeated-measures ANCOVAs with test version as a covariate to evaluate changes in 




Results and Discussion 
 
Outlier Analysis. Outliers in the data were evaluated by examining the average training 
performance for each participant. Using a criterion of 2 SD, we identified two low-performing 
outliers who performed below at an n-back level of 1.4 and 1.25. However, the exclusion of 
these outliers did not impact the outcome of the analyses detailed below, and thus they were not 
removed for the analyses described here. 
 Effect of Payment on Traits.  A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) 
examining the paid (dual n-back) versus unpaid (dual n-back and knowledge trainer) groups and 
eight trait measures (extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional stability, 
intellectual openness, cognitive failures, TOCA, and Need for Cognition, see Table 4.2) revealed 
significant group differences at pre-test on personality and motivational factors for participants 
who completed the training, F(8,77) = 4.508, p <.001, Wilks’ Λ = .681; η2 p = .319. Univariate 
ANOVAs were then conducted for each measure using a Bonferroni adjusted α level of .00625 
(.05/8). For the personality factors, there was no difference for Extraversion rating F(1,84) = 
2.635, p = .108, η2 p = .030, Intellectual Openness F(1,84) = .704, p = .404, η
2
 p = .008, 
Agreeableness F(1,84) = 1.049, p = .309, η2 p = .012, or Emotional stability F(1,84) = 6.885, p 
=.010, η2 p = .076. Additionally, there was no difference between the paid and unpaid groups on 
the Theories of Cognitive Abilities measure F(1,84) = 2.389, p = .126, η2 p = .028 or Need for 
Cognition F(1,84) = 5.547, p =.021, η2 p =.062. However, the unpaid group reported higher 
occurrences of cognitive failures (113.12, SD = 20.982) versus the paid group (99.34, SD = 
18.154), F(1,84) = 9.959, p = .002, η2 p = .106. This result is consistent with the earlier study in 
which an unpaid training group reported a greater number of cognitive failures than a paid non-
training group (Jaeggi et al., 2014). Participants with higher self-perception of cognitive deficits, 
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or those who placed greater value on cognitive skills, may have been attracted to the unpaid 
“brain training” study. This suggests that methods of recruitment -- such as whether participants 
are compensated or drawn in with the possibility of cognitive improvement -- may be related to 
certain individual differences across subjects. 
 
Table 4.2. Baseline trait differences by paid/unpaid condition, using a Bonferroni correction with 
α at .00625. Effect size is partial eta-squared. 




















Need for Cognition 36 48.44 35.82 51 67.80 39.00 0.02 0.06 
TOCA 36 31.41 7.41 51 33.63 7.66 0.16 0.02 



















Extraversion 36 45.00 10.56 51 41.10 12.00 0.11 0.03 
Conscientiousness 36 50.28 8.54 51 46.47 10.38 0.07 0.04 
Intellectual Openness 36 53.28 7.15 51 53.80 10.55 0.48 0.01 
Agreeableness 36 54.22 9.10 51 52.12 8.65 0.31 0.01 
Emotional Stability 36 36.25 12.45 51 42.63 10.04 0.01 0.08 
 
 
Training Data. To examine training performance, a slope and intercept were calculated 
for each participant and the slope was then compared across the three groups. The three training 
groups (paid dual n-back, unpaid dual n-back, and knowledge trainer) all significantly improved 
performance on the training task over the four weeks of training (ps < .01) (see Figure 4.2 for 
comparison of the two dual n-back training groups). The paid dual n-back group improved 87%, 
from an average of 2.32 in the first session to 4.33 in the last session, and the unpaid dual n-back 
group improved by a similar amount (79%), from an average n-back level of 2.42 in the first 
session to an n-back level of 4.33 in the last session. The knowledge-trainer group improved by 
44% over the course of the training. A comparison of training performance revealed no 
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significant difference in baseline training performance F(1,58) = .273, p =.603, η2 p = .005, or the 
rate of improvement as determined by a linear regression with a logarithmic transformation of 
the number of session across the paid and unpaid dual n-back training groups F(1,58) = .913, p 
=.343, η2 p = .016. A Bayesian follow-up analysis largely supported these results, with BF10 = 
0.299 for baseline training performance, and BF10 = 0.396 for training slope. 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Training improvements in the dual n-back training groups. 
 
Overall Transfer Effects. Descriptive data and test-retest reliabilities and effect sizes for 
individual assessments are included in Table 4.3. It should be noted that, for the purpose of 
calculating the composite scores, z-scores were calculated from the individual pre- and post-test 
measures (z-scores were not used in Jaeggi et al. (2014)) (see Figure 4.3). There were no 
significant group differences among pre-test scores of the unpaid dual n-back group, paid dual n-
back group, and the knowledge-trainer group for the Visuospatial composite F(2,85) = 1.160, p = 
.318, η2 p = .027 or the Verbal composite F(2,84) = 1.286, p =.282, η
2
 p = .030. Transfer 
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differences within the present study were assessed with repeated measures ANCOVAs for the 
pre- and post-test factor scores with initial test version as a covariate (Figure 4.4). Among the 
paid dual n-back group compared to the knowledge-training group, there was a significant effect 
of intervention for the Visuospatial Reasoning composite F(1,60)=6.737, p = .012, η2 p = .101 but 
not the Verbal Reasoning composite F(1,60) = .409, p = .525, η2 p = .007. There were no 
significant differences in transfer between the paid and the unpaid dual n-back groups, for both 
the Visuospatial composite F(1,58) = .233, p =.631, η2 p = .004 and the Verbal composite F(1,57) 
= .274, p = .603, η2 p = .005. Follow-up Bayesian analyses again largely supported both the 
baseline and transfer results, with BF10 = .292 for the Visuospatial composite and BF10 = .200 for 
the Verbal composite at baseline, and with BF10 = .443 for the Visuospatial composite and BF10 

























Table 4.3. Individual transfer measures by group. R = test–retest reliability (partial correlations 
accounting for test version); ES = effect size that accounts for the correlation between the pre- 
and post-test measures,  
 
 
 Pretest Posttest Pre vs. Post 
Dual N-back Paid N Mean SD Min Max N Mean SD Min Max P R ES 
APM 36 13.39 2.38 8 18 36 13.94 2.70 7 18  0.49 0.21 
BOMAT 36 16.39 3.86 7 23 36 16.58 3.52 10 23  0.68 0.07 
Surface Dev 36 20.00 7.45 7 30 36 22.78 6.22 7 30 ** 0.71 0.52 
Space Relations 36 12.89 3.43 3 17 36 13.83 2.96 7 17 * 0.66 0.35 
Form Board 36 65.00 22.28 24 109 36 78.86 26.44 19 117 *** 0.76 0.68 
CFT 36 19.47 2.93 13 24 36 19.31 2.96 12 26  0.20 -0.04 
Inferences 36 7.72 1.57 2 10 36 7.97 1.63 2 10  0.45 0.14 
Reading Com 36 6.06 2.18 1 10 36 6.47 2.26 2 10  0.69 0.24 
Verbal Analogies 36 0.78 0.10 0.56 0.91 36 0.80 0.07 0.65 0.93  0.51 0.31 
DST 36 72.86 14.20 46 113 36 76.17 15.20 47 113 * 0.79 0.35 
 
Dual N-back Unpaid 
             
APM 25 15.32 2.63 8 18 25 14.96 2.70 8 18  0.61 -0.15 
BOMAT 25 18.24 3.26 12 24 25 18.48 3.90 11 25  0.68 0.08 
Surface Dev 25 19.96 8.50 5 30 25 22.88 8.10 4 30 ** 0.80 0.55 
Space Relations 25 12.40 4.17 4 17 25 13.36 4.08 4 17  0.73 0.32 
Form Board 25 61.92 28.20 0 107 25 75.68 25.20 25 123 *** 0.77 0.79 
CFT 25 19.84 3.95 11 27 25 20.56 3.25 14 26  0.48 0.19 
Inferences 25 7.16 1.91 2 10 25 7.68 1.68 3 10  0.31 0.25 
Reading Comp 25 7.52 2.02 4 10 25 7.60 2.57 1 10  0.69 0.04 
Verbal Analogies 24 0.74 0.10 0.55 0.92 25 0.75 0.08 0.56 0.9  0.40 0.10 
DST 24 67.88 13.26 40 88 25 70.36 12.77 42 91  0.86 0.36 
 
Knowledge Training  
             
APM 27 14.81 2.79 7 18 27 14.74 2.80 8 18  0.60 -0.03 
BOMAT 27 18.00 4.10 7 23 27 17.63 3.78 11 26  0.72 -0.12 
Surface Dev 27 21.41 8.23 1 30 27 22.56 7.65 0 30  0.84 0.25 
Space Relations 27 13.48 3.12 7 17 27 13.81 3.11 4 17  0.43 0.10 
Form Board 27 67.41 27.26 5 115 27 66.63 24.49 22 117  0.73 -0.04 
CFT 27 19.63 3.12 14 26 27 19.63 3.12 12 24  0.44 0.00 
Inferences 27 7.22 1.91 2 10 27 7.96 1.89 2 10 * 0.66 0.47 
Reading Comp 27 6.04 2.77 0 10 27 5.85 2.78 1 10  0.74 -0.09 
Verbal Analogies 27 0.72 0.10 0.54 0.87 27 0.75 0.09 0.56 0.90  0.29 0.26 





Figure 4.3. Repeated Measures by condition using standardized composite score. Error bars 
represent the Standard Error of the Mean. 
 
 
Figure 4.4. Standardized composite gain by dual n-back training group; two-tailed ANCOVA. 




The primary purpose of the present research, as a follow-up to a study by Jaeggi et al. 
(2014), was to determine whether or not motivational factors, specifically the difference between 
extrinsic motivation related to payment versus intrinsic motivation related to participant-driven 
desire to improve cognition, might impact transfer gains following cognitive training. As 
discussed, we identified one common thread across cognitive training studies thus far. That is the 
possible link between compensation and transfer: studies such as Redick et al. (2013) and 
Thompson et al. (2013) that provided substantial monetary compensation linked to completion 
(but not performance) in WM training were generally less successful in demonstrating transfer to 
visuospatial measures compared those that have not provided significant compensation (Jaeggi et 
al., 2008; Jaeggi et al., 2010; Stephenson & Halpern, 2013). We hypothesized that compensation 
might be one determinant of transfer following cognitive training, as previous motivational 
research has found that monetary compensation may impact performance in linked activities. 
The present study found no significant differences in transfer between the compensated 
and unpaid groups, however. Both improved significantly and by similar amounts on the 
visuospatial composite, and both experienced no transfer gains on the verbal factor, despite the 
offer of significant compensation identical to that provided by Redick et al. (2013). While there 
are many questions regarding the underlying mechanisms of these improvements – for example, 
it is possible that some other ability besides WM, such as interference resolution, may be 
improved through the training, and that those improvements may lead to transfer effects – the 
actual pattern of performance on the outcome measures is quite similar across the paid and 
unpaid group. As in the experiment by Redick et al., participants in the unpaid group were not 
recruited using self-improvement language; however, the rest of the protocol mirrored that used 
in Jaeggi et al. (2014). Several possibilities exist for why the present group experienced transfer 
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despite significant compensation. One cause may be the inclusion in the consent form of a brief 
mention that the task may be able to improve intelligence. Given that fifteen individuals later 
identified this as a motivation for joining the study (despite no improvement language being 
included in any recruitment materials) it is possible that some participants possessed multiple 
motivations for completing the research, or that their motivations changed during the month-long 
training period. This is consistent with motivation research that has found that extrinsic reward, 
if coupled with self-motivation to complete a task, may not necessarily have a deleterious effect 
on a targeted activity (Robinson et al., 2012).  Additionally, despite not being told that they were 
part of a “brain-training” study, many participants were probably able to correctly infer that the 
purpose of the study was to improve cognition. Whether or not participants realize experimenters 
are attempting to improve fluid intelligence per se, the combination of feedback via adaptivity 
and the display of training curves likely leads many to conclude that they are being tested on 
whether they improve on the pre and post measures. Thus, despite our best efforts to hide this 
purpose from participants in the extrinsic reward group, some intrinsic motivation based on 
improving cognition may develop across the 20 training sessions. 
We divided participants in the paid group into intrinsically motivated (N = 15) and 
extrinsically motivated (N = 21) groups depending on their answer to the final motivation check 
question as given at the post-test. A comparison of these participants at pre-test revealed 
significant differences in the baseline Visuospatial composite, with higher values for the 
intrinsically motivated participants (3.869, SD = .504) versus the extrinsic group (3.403, SD = 
.746), F(1,34) = 4.204, p =.048, η2 p = .113, but not for the Verbal factor (extrinsic = 5.11, SD = 
.731; intrinsic = 5.15, SD = .585; F(1,34) = .220, p = .642, η2 p = .007); this result supports the 
idea that there is a great deal of variability in intrinsic motivation of participants in training 
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studies regardless of recruitment method. However, there were no significant differences across 
these groups in training performance F(1,34) = .514, p = .478, η2 p = .015, or transfer to 
Visuospatial F(1,34) = .791, p =.380, η2 p =.023 or Verbal composites F(1,34) = 1.342, p =.255, 





Figure 4.5. Paid group dual n-back training curves as a function of the response to the motivation 
check question. 
 
Although the small group sizes must temper any conclusions drawn from these data, the 
varied responses to the final motivation question within the paid dual n-back training group 
suggests that individuals who sign up for training studies may be differentially motivated to 
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participate in this research. Despite these individual differences, however, there were again no 
significant differences in transfer or training gains between these groups. 
It is possible that there are a variety of other group differences, such as education level, 
age, or socioeconomic status that are more closely linked to transfer than compensation, and that 
may account for the improvements in untrained measures found here as opposed to Redick et al. 
(2013) and Thompson et al. (2013). In this study a few significant group differences were 
identified between the paid and unpaid cohort: the compensated dual n-back cohort was younger 
and reported fewer cognitive failures relative to the unpaid group. Additionally, the attrition rate 
between the paid and unpaid groups was quite different. In this study the significant 
compensation may have reduced overall dropout rates from the study, although it is worth noting 
that at least one previous study with an identical compensation level had a much higher drop-out 
rate, possibly as a result of other group differences, such as those mentioned above (Redick et al., 
2013).  
In the present study cohort differences did not impact training improvements or transfer, 
however. This suggests that, although the addition of extrinsic reward during recruitment may 
attract different individuals to join a study initially, the nature of these differences and how they 
contribute to training performance and transfer may be somewhat complex, and, furthermore, 
may even change throughout the course of a month-long intervention. Within the paid group, the 
participants who reported only being motivated by money scored lower on the pre-test 
visuospatial composite than those with an additional intrinsic motivation, suggesting that there 
may be baseline differences across differently motivated individuals. Again, however, these 
differences did not significantly impact the outcome of the training or transfer. It is worth 
considering these differences in light of other studies in which participants were not informed of 
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potential cognitive improvements from training (Redick et al., 2013), as certain individuals may 
be more likely to drop out of the study if they would otherwise be self-motivated to continue. 
Dropout rates for n-back training studies have been so significant across both compensated and 
uncompensated groups (Jaeggi et al., 2014; Redick et al., 2013) that these considerations must be 
taken into account in future studies. Compensation, the promise of cognitive improvement in 
advertising the study, as well as the overall style and tone of the protocol should be more 
carefully considered when conducting cognitive training research. Nonetheless, the present work 
demonstrates that compensation need not necessarily negatively impact training improvements 
and transfer gains.  
The similarity between the paid and unpaid group in training and transfer facilitated 
additional analyses that drew on this increased power and we further examined the effect of 
personality factors and beliefs on transfer improvement. As discussed earlier, one potential 
concern is that participants’ personal beliefs about the malleability of cognitive abilities may 
influence training and transfer gains (Jaeggi et al., 2014). If there are differences in beliefs about 
malleability across different training groups, it is possible that some transfer effects are actually 
placebo effects. To ensure that the effect of the intervention was significant even when 
controlling for participant beliefs about the malleability of cognition, we computed an 
ANCOVA comparing the combined dual n-back groups to the knowledge training control group, 
with gain on the visuospatial composite as the dependent variable and participant score on the 
Theories of Cognitive Abilities Scale (TOCA) as a covariate. This analysis found that TOCA 
accounted for a marginal portion of the variance F(1,83) = 3.260, p = .075, ηp^2 = .038. Even 
when controlling for TOCA, the comparison of the combined dual n-back groups versus the 
knowledge trainer group revealed that the effect of the intervention remained significant, 
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suggesting that there was little to no placebo effect F(1,83)=6.003, p = .016, ηp^2 = .067. 
Nevertheless, it remains possible that participants’ personal beliefs impact the outcome of the 
training in meaningful ways that we have not investigated here; for example, it is possible that 
individuals may have different expectations about the effectiveness of different types of training. 
That is, participants may believe that the visuospatial aspects of the dual n-back task are more 
likely to improve visuospatial abilities compared to the knowledge trainer, which is entirely 
verbal. To conclusively test for different possible placebo effects, larger studies with multiple 
control groups would be required; the goal of this study, however, is not to resolve questions 
about the effectiveness of cognitive training but to examine the impact of monetary 
compensation on these interventions.  
Conclusion. The current study finds that even a relatively substantial amount of 
monetary compensation for participation does not seem to impact the outcome of WM training. 
This finding was unexpected considering the extant literature and the recent meta-analysis that 
investigated compensation and cognitive training (Au et al., 2014). However, even the Au et al. 
meta-analysis did not find a significant effect of renumeration on the outcome of training once an 
outlier study was removed from the analysis. One potential reason why, regardless of 
compensation, that we found transfer in this study is that our protocol may have ensured that our 
participants maintained strong intrinsic motivation over the course of the intervention. A classic 
study of motivation finds that the actual language and style of the protocol may matter a great 
deal in alleviating any undermining effect payment may have—especially if that language 
encourages participants to perform well (Ryan, Mims, & Koestner, 1983).  
These results suggest that renumeration may be not be harmful in cognitive training studies. 
Compensation may even aid in compliance with the training, as the attrition rate from the paid 
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dual n-back group was significantly lower than that in the unpaid group. Even participants who 
did not state an intrinsic motivation for signing up for the study may nonetheless have engaged 
more during the training program due to a sense of personal improvement during the course of 
training. Therefore we suggest that monetary compensation, if offered in a careful fashion that 
does not interfere with participants’ intrinsic motivation to improve cognition and apply 
themselves to the training paradigm, may help future researchers in motivating participants to 
complete these lengthy and time-intensive training regimens. Future studies should help to 
establish which individual differences in motivation may ultimately influence transfer 
improvements following cognitive training, as well as whether specific protocol and 
methodological features may help or hinder these outcomes.  
It is also interesting to note that, unlike Foroughi et al (2016), we did not find a 
significant difference between the control and experimental group based on the Theories of 
Intelligence Scale. Furthermore, there was no difference in performance on the outcome of 
training between the two groups, even though our recruitment flyers differed in a similar manner 
to those used in the Foroughi study. It may be that while placebo effects may be present 
throughout training to some degree, they only have a meaningful impact on the outcome of 
training in a very short intervention. Because most cognitive training studies include many 
sessions of training, placebo effects may only rarely play a role; however, like Foroughi and 
colleagues, we recommend that future studies examine placebo effects to learn whether this is 
indeed the case. 
 These results have important implications for future research in WM training, but several 
issues limit the conclusions that may be drawn from the present study. The paid and unpaid 
cohorts were collected in different semesters so that no participant would respond to both 
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posters; this may be a factor contributing to some demographic differences between these 
groups. Additionally, the knowledge-training comparison group was collected only as part of the 
unpaid cohort; a matched-paid group was not examined as part of the study. Despite these 
differences, the pattern of transfer across the two dual n-back groups was remarkably similar. 
This result suggests that the effects of dual n-back training may be more resilient to certain 
moderating factors than previously expected -- at least under conditions in which the 
experimental protocol is carefully implemented.  
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Individual Differences and tDCS-Augmented Cognitive Training 
 
Introduction 
Considering the importance of working memory (WM) for success in a wide variety of 
real-life contexts, including school (Alloway & Alloway, 2010) and work (Higgins, Peterson, 
Pihl, & M, 2007), it is unsurprising that a variety of WM interventions have been proposed in 
recent years. Transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) and cognitive training are two 
cognitive enhancement techniques that have recently been used together to improve WM, with 
promising, but by no means conclusive, results. A recent meta-analysis from Mancuso et al. 
(2016) suggests that dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) stimulation during training results in 
a small but significant enhancement effect, which survives corrections for publication bias. 
Recent research (Au et al., 2016) provides further evidence that DLPFC stimulation (both right 
and left) enhances performance on a widely used n-back training task over the course of seven 
sessions, relative to a Sham stimulation condition. While these initial findings do provide some 
preliminary support for the use of tDCS to enhance learning of WM-intensive tasks, we note 
considerable heterogeneity in the literature. For example, a similarly designed n-back/tDCS 
training study failed to find an effect of tDCS after correcting for baseline differences (Martin et 
al., 2013), and the ten tDCS/WM training studies covered in the Mancuso et al. (2016) meta-
analysis differ substantially in the magnitude of their effects, with Hedges’ g values ranging from 
0.074 to 0.565. A variety of factors, including differences in stimulation intensity, density, 
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location, and other parameters, as well as the design and implementation of the cognitive training 
paradigm, may explain the disparities in the strength of these effects (see Au et al., 2016 for a 
brief discussion). However, one additional possibility is that individual differences among 
participants – including motivation, gender, and baseline ability, among many factors – may play 
important roles. These factors may influence the outcome of the combined intervention in their 
own right, but they may also be associated with other individual-difference characteristics that 
influence performance (for example, different geographic training locations may be confounded 
with educational background). While extant research does suggest that individual differences 
play a significant role in both tDCS interventions (Krause & Cohen Kadosh, 2014) and cognitive 
training interventions (Jaeggi, Buschkuehl, Shah, & Jonides, 2014; Katz, Jones, Shah, 
Buschkuehl, & Jaeggi, in press) by themselves, these factors have rarely been investigated 
directly in studies that combine both interventions.  
Baseline performance and other individual-difference factors in tDCS. Studies by 
Wiethoff, Hamada, and Rothwell (2014) and Lopez-Alonso et al. (2014) have found that even in 
tDCS experiments that successfully demonstrate an effect on cognition overall, less than half of 
the participants demonstrate improved performance. This suggests that a considerable proportion 
of participants in each study may not be responding to the treatment. Additionally, recent work 
has raised controversy about the previously dominant neural explanation for tDCS-related 
cognitive enhancement (Buzsáki, 2016). While the consensus thus far has been that anodal 
stimulation causes depolarization of the resting membrane potential, facilitating the production 
of action potentials, Buzsáki’s work with cadavers questions the amount of current that actually 
reaches the cortex. Thus it is possible that certain individual physical characteristics could have a 
larger effect than expected previously. For example, even something as seemingly minor as hair 
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thickness may impact electrode contact and further reduce the amount of current passing through 
the scalp and skull. However, several individual-difference factors have been studied in 
conjunction with tDCS prior to Buzsáki’s provocative findings. Kraus and Cohen Kadosh (2014) 
suggested that age, gender, and neuronal factors, namely regional cortical excitability, may 
influence the effectiveness of transcranial electrical stimulation. For example, it has been 
proposed that an optimal balance of excitation/inhibition in different cortical regions promotes 
optimal cognitive functioning. Therefore, tDCS may exert different and sometimes contradictory 
effects in populations that vary with respect to this balance, such as those with ADHD or 
depression (Krause, Marquez-Ruiz, & Cohen Kadosh, 2013). Furthermore, genetic factors 
(Brunoni et al., 2013; Plewnia et al., 2013) and anatomical differences that impact the electric 
field generated by tDCS (Kim et al., 2014) may also influence the response to stimulation. 
In addition to these physiological characteristics, it is also possible that psychological 
characteristics, such as baseline cognitive ability, may influence the outcome of stimulation. 
Several studies have demonstrated selective tDCS benefits among individuals with low, but not 
high, baseline WM abilities (Gozenman & Berryhill, 2016; Heinen et al., 2016; Tseng et al., 
2012), and meta-analyses tend to report stronger effect sizes in clinical or older adult populations 
compared to the higher-performing young adult population (Dedoncker, Brunoni, Baeken, & 
Vanderhasselt, 2016; Hill, Fitzgerald, & Hoy, 2016; Hsu, Ku, Zanto, & Gazzaley, 2015; 
Summers, Kang, & Cauraugh, 2015). Moreover, the evidence extends beyond the WM domain. 
Individuals with poorer motor coordination (McCambridge, Bradnam, Stinear, & Byblow, 2011; 
Uehara, Coxon, & Byblow, 2015), postural control (Zhou et al., 2015), visual acuity (Reinhart, 
Xiao, McClenahan, & Woodman, 2016), and attention (London & Slagter, 2015; Sikstrom et al., 
2016) all showed improvement in the relevant domains while their higher-performing peers did 
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not. However, it should be noted that these low-baseline effects are not found universally. One 
group of researchers has repeatedly found an advantage for high-baseline individuals on WM 
performance during parietal stimulation (Berryhill & Jones, 2012; Jones & Berryhill, 2012; 
Jones, Gozenman, & Berryhill, 2015), which has been replicated by others (Learmonth, Thut, 
Benwell, & Harvey, 2015). Another group examining lateralized attention bias found both high- 
and low-baseline advantages in two separate experiments, but the direction of this advantage 
depended critically on stimulation intensity (Benwell, Learmonth, Miniussi, Harvey, & Thut, 
2015). Therefore, there is no consensus on the influence of baseline performance at present. 
Also, there are likely even more nuanced issues to consider, such as the brain region stimulated 
and task-specific optimum levels of neural activity. Thus, there is considerable value in studying 
tDCS effects in the context of baseline ability, as well as other individual-difference factors. 
Baseline performance and other individual-difference factors in working memory 
training. Some research has also been done to examine the effects of individual-difference 
factors in the outcome of WM training by itself, unaided by tDCS. For example, baseline 
performance has also been studied in this context, and much like in the tDCS literature, there is 
also evidence that baseline WM abilities could impact training performance in two possible 
directions. Some have suggested that individuals with a lower baseline score should have more 
room to improve at the trained task during the intervention; for example, Zinke and colleagues 
have demonstrated this through two studies with older adults (Zinke, Zeintl, Eschen, Herzog, & 
Kliegel, 2012; Zinke et al., 2014). Others have posited that individuals with higher baseline WM 
performance are better prepared to take advantage of the intervention and thus improve more 
throughout the training (Lövdén, Bäckman, Lindenberger, Schaefer, & Schmiedek, 2010). There 
is not yet consensus regarding the impact of baseline performance for the outcome of cognitive 
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training; it also remains possible that ceiling effects and differences in the design of the training 
intervention itself may also influence the relationship between starting WM ability and level of 
improvement in any individual study.  
A variety of other individual-difference factors have also been discussed in the context of 
cognitive training. For example, motivation to complete a task may influence how receptive one 
is to a training intervention (Jaeggi, Buschkuehl, Jonides, & Shah, 2011; Jaeggi et al., 2014). 
Many interventions include game-like elements that may influence a participant’s motivation as 
well as his/her performance on the task (Katz, Jaeggi, Buschkuehl, Stegman, & Shah, 2014; 
Prins, Dovis, Ponsioen, ten Brink, & van der Oord, 2010), with the general expectation that more 
motivated or engaged participants will perform better in the training. Additionally, many training 
studies provide considerable monetary remuneration for participation, and it is possible that this 
payment may undermine motivation and thus impact overall performance (Au et al., 2015). As 
mentioned earlier, the study location (e.g., university vs. small college but also different 
countries; c.f., Au et al., 2015) may influence the outcome of training, although it is difficult to 
identify which element of geographic location, including cultural factors, actually may play a 
role in performance. Age has also been studied extensively as a factor that may determine 
performance on cognitive training tasks. In general, older individuals seem to improve less on 
untrained tasks administered at pre- and post-test, as well as on the training task itself (Borella et 
al., 2014; Brehmer, Westerberg, & Bäckman, 2012; Schmiedek, Lovden, & Lindenberger, 2010; 
Zinke et al., 2014). Although one meta-analysis found no differences in transfer improvements as 
a function of age (Karbach & Verhaeghen, 2014), another meta-analysis with a larger range of 
ages found that younger adults improved more on untrained tasks than older adults (Wass, Scerif, 
& Johnson, 2012). These age-related disparities make some sense given well-established 
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differences in age-related WM performance (D. C. Park et al., 2002) and theoretical perspective 
on cognitive plasticity and aging (Lövdén et al., 2010). However, it remains unknown whether 
age-related differences in cognitive training performance are due to differences in baseline 
performance or other factors related to aging. Finally, traits such as conscientiousness and 
neuroticism (Barbara Studer-Luethi, Bauer, & Perrig, 2015; B. Studer-Luethi, Jaeggi, 
Buschkuehl, & Perrig, 2012) may also impact the outcome of training, while other factors, such 
as gender, have been found to influence the outcome of training in some studies (Söderqvist, 
Bergman Nutley, Ottersen, Grill, & Klingberg, 2012) but not others (Klingberg et al., 2005). It 
remains possible that a number of other factors that have been largely unexplored (e.g., 
socioeconomic status, although see Segretin et al., 2014) may play a role, at least in some 
interventions.  
  Given the relevance of individual-difference factors to the outcome of cognitive training 
and tDCS independently, a salient question is how these individual-difference factors influence 
combined interventions featuring both tDCS and WM training together. It is possible, and 
perhaps even likely, that there are interactions between these two interventions such that some 
individual-difference factors matter more than others, particularly in the outcome of a combined 
intervention. For example, in light of the evidence that baseline cognitive ability impacts both the 
amount one is able to improve during a training intervention and the participant’s response to 
tDCS, it is possible that it will play a much larger role in a combined intervention. The relative 
paucity of tDCS-augmented cognitive training studies means that it is unsurprising that these 
factors have not yet been explored in combined interventions. However, given the possibility that 
they may play a substantial role in the outcomes of such interventions, there is considerable 
impetus for studying them. Thus, the present paper uses a recently published dataset of tDCS and 
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WM training data to evaluate the influence of individual differences including baseline 
performance, motivation, gender, and geographic training location on WM training performance.
 As illustrated above, individual differences are one topic of relevance in improving our 
understanding of why stimulation-augmented cognitive training may be effective for any 
individual participant. Another point of significant practical importance is how durable training 
improvements may be over the weeks and months following the intervention. It would likely not 
make sense to utilize tDCS/WM interventions in real-world applications if the improvements 
generated by the stimulation dissipated shortly after the intervention. While previous research 
suggests that there is durability even several months following the intervention (Au et al., 2016), 
little extant tDCS work examines the stability of improvements over time, and results from WM 
training research suggest that washout may be a common occurrence within a short time 
following a training intervention (Melby-Lervåg & Hulme, 2013). By contrast, some studies 
suggest that improvements following tDCS interventions may remain weeks or even months 
following the stimulation. Jeon et al. (2012), Jones et al. (2015), and Park et al. (2014) all found 
continued improvements to WM performance from a week to two months following stimulation. 
Persistent, long-term changes have also been detected as a function of learning or training in 
other domains as well, such as motor-skill training (Reis et al., 2009), math training (Looi et al., 
2016), and episodic-memory retrieval (Manenti, Sandrini, Brambilla, & Cotelli, 2016). However, 
to our knowledge, no other study of combined tDCS and cognitive training has examined 
whether these follow-up effects are maintained for time periods in excess of two to three months 
after the intervention. In the present study we added to the follow-up findings from Au et al. 
(2016), including new data not previously reported in which participants returned an average of 
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12 months following the intervention to complete one more session of the WM training (without 
stimulation). 
Methods 
Participants. Our dataset comprised largely the same participants as that of Au et al. 
(2016), which recruited healthy, right-handed individuals between the ages of 18 and 35 as part 
of a collaborative effort from the campuses of the University of California, Irvine (UCI) and the 
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor (UM). Six additional individuals completed study 
procedures, one of whom was excluded as an outlier (see Results), for a total sample size of 67 in 
the current dataset. As before, participants were excluded if they had had any history of 
psychological or neurological disorders (including seizures or strokes), previous cognitive 
training or neurostimulation, past or present drug/alcohol abuse, or if they were taking any 
medications that would affect attention or memory. All research procedures were approved by 
the Institutional Review Boards at both universities, and each participant provided informed 
consent. 
General Procedure. The experiment, an extension of a previous report (Au et al., 2016), 
consisted of a between-subjects pretest-posttest intervention design in which participants were 
randomized into one of two groups. Forty received Active tDCS (Active group) over the right or 
left DLPFC and 27 received Sham stimulation (Sham group) to the same regions in which 
current was turned off after the first 30 seconds without the participants’ knowledge. The 
previous report analyzed the right and left DLPFC groups separately in the Active condition, but 
since we found no differences in the training effect, they are collapsed together in the present 
chapter. Both groups completed seven days of visuospatial n-back training concurrently with 
either Active or Sham stimulation.  
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After the initial training period, all participants were invited back for two follow-up sessions to 
examine the stability of training effects. Forty-one participants returned for the first follow-up 
(27 Active and 14 Sham), as reported previously (Au et al., 2016), and 26 participants returned 
for the second follow-up in the present study (18 Active and 8 Sham). Due to the long delay, the 
follow-up visits were marred by substantial attrition rates, but 25 of the 26 participants in the 
second follow-up also participated in the first follow-up, thereby allowing us to evaluate the 
longitudinal trajectory of a stable cohort of individuals. The mean delay after the initial training 
period was 221 days (range: 97 – 393; SD = 82) for the first follow-up and 355 days (range: 251 
- 471; SD=73) for the second follow-up. Maintenance of transfer effects was not evaluated at this 
second follow-up due to the lack of sustained transfer during the first follow-up. 
Working Memory Training. The training task was a computerized adaptive visuospatial 
n-back task in which a series of blue squares was displayed one at a time, each in one of eight 
possible spatial locations. Participants were asked to indicate whether the current square was in 
the same position as the square presented n trials ago by responding with the letter “A” to targets 
and “L” to non-targets, using a standard computer keyboard. The difficulty of the task adapted 
continuously based on the trainee’s performance. The average n-back level at which a participant 
trained was calculated each day, and the primary dependent variable for analysis was the 
logarithmic slope of the 7-session training curve. Further details regarding the design of the 
training task can be found in Au et al. (2016). 
Transcranial Direct Current Stimulation. Stimulation was administered via a Soterix 
Medical 1x1 Low-Intensity tDCS device (Model 1300A) using 5x7cm sponge electrodes placed 
horizontally on the head. The anode was placed over either right or left DLPFC (sites F4 and F3 
in the international 10-20 EEG system) and the cathode was placed over the contralateral 
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supraorbital area (sites Fp1 or Fp2). Stimulation lasted 25 minutes, with a current intensity of 
2mA, which ramped up and down for the first and last 30 seconds of stimulation. Sham tDCS 
was set up in exactly the same way, except that the current was shut off between the 30-second 
ramping periods at the beginning and end of each session. 
Individual-difference Variables. Baseline: A baseline score for each participant was 
determined by his/her visual n-back score at pre-test, measured as Pr, the proportion of hits 
minus the proportion of false alarms (Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988). The visual n-back task, which 
required participants to identify whether a series of colored balls matched the color of the items 
presented n before, is similar but not identical to the trained visuospatial n-back, which involved 
sequential presentation of a square in different spatial locations. In the absence of a true 
unstimulated baseline of the actual training task, the visual n-back was chosen as the closest 
reasonable proxy. Although our pretest battery consisted of four WM tasks—visual n-back, 
auditory n-back, digit span, and Corsi blocks—the latter two are span tests which correlate only 
weakly with n-back performance (Redick & Lindsey, 2013), while the former two are 
structurally similar to the trained visuospatial n-back. Although the previous report (Au et al., 
2016) made the a priori decision to combine these two n-back tests into a composite measure to 
test for group differences in baseline, we ended up finding strong transfer effects only in the 
visual, but not auditory, n-back test. This suggests a close link between visual n-back and our 
visuospatial training task (correlation between pre-test visual n-back score and first visuospatial 
n-back training session: r = .65). Therefore, it is chosen as the most appropriate index of baseline 
WM ability in the current study. The average baseline performance on the visual n-back task in 
the Active group was .66 (SD=.16) and the average score in the Sham group was .62 (SD=.19); 
the difference between groups was not significant (p = .36). 
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 Motivation: Motivation was assessed before each training session by self-report. 
Participants were asked to rate their own motivational state on a scale from 1-10, with 10 being 
the most highly motivated. An average motivation score over all seven sessions was calculated 
for each participant and used as the dependent variable in analyses. Average motivation scores 
were 6.1 (SD=1.24) in the Active group and 6.1 (SD=1.01) in the Sham group. We note that 
although motivation was briefly considered in the previous report (Au et al., 2016), the analysis 
focused only on confirming the stability of motivation across groups and time, and we did not 
previously evaluate motivation as an individual-difference factor to predict training outcome as 
in the current chapter. 
 Gender: Gender information was collected as part of a standard demographic 
questionnaire during the consent process. The Active group comprised 60% women, while the 
Sham group comprised 67% women. 
 Training Site: 50% of Active participants were recruited on each campus (UCI and UM), 
while 59% of Sham participants were recruited at UM.  
Analytic Approach. Statistical analyses were conducted using IBM SPSS Statistics 
version 22 and STATA version 13. To identify the effects of individual-difference variables on 
training performance, separate regression models were calculated for each variable of interest 
using parameters of a logarithmic model run on the training data, yielding a 7-session training 
slope as the outcome variable, with condition, the variable of interest, and their interaction as 
prediction terms. Note that Au et al. (2016) used a seven-level repeated measures ANOVA to 
analyze training performance. However, for our current analyses, we required an index of 
training performance as an outcome variable for the regression models. We opted for individual 
slopes in order to take into account the entire trajectory of training performance. Individual-
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difference variables included gender, school site, motivation, and baseline n-back performance. 
All continuous variables were standardized, and thus also mean-centered, while categorical 
variables remain unstandardized to preserve the inherent structure of the dummy coding and to 
maintain interpretability. To identify the effects of the long-term follow-up, a similar method 
was used as in Au et al. (2016) in which gain on the training task was calculated by subtracting 
performance in the follow-up session from that of the initial training session. This gain was then 
used as the dependent variable in an ANCOVA with condition as a between-subjects factor. Due 
to the post-hoc nature of this follow-up, the time lag between the final session of the initial 
intervention and the follow-up varied between participants and thus was included as a covariate.  
 
Results 
Outlier Analysis. Outliers in the data were evaluated by examining the average training 
performance across all 7 sessions for each participant, as done previously (Au et al., 2016). 
Outliers were only examined in the Sham group because no new Active participants were 
enrolled since the previous report. Using a criterion of 2 SD, we identified one high-performing 
outlier who trained at an average n-back level of 7.9, almost twice the group average of the 
remaining Sham participants (mean: 4.19, SD=1.27). However, we also note that the primary 
findings presented below are not impacted by the presence or absence of this outlier. 
Training Performance by Condition (Active vs. Sham). Because five participants were 
added to the sample beyond the participants included in Au et al. (2016), and because here we 
use the parameters of a logarithmic model (slope of training curve) as a measure of training 
progress (instead of the mixed ANOVAs with training performance for each session as used 
before), an initial model was calculated to re-establish the difference between the Sham and 
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Active conditions. A standard linear regression was performed between training slope as the 
outcome variable and condition (Active and Sham) as the predictor variable. The condition factor 
was found to explain a significant amount of variance in the slope, F(1,65) = 11.65, p < .001, R2 
= .15, R2 adjusted = .14. Condition significantly predicted slope (Beta = .79, t(66) = 3.41, p = 
.001) in that Active participants on average performed .79 standard deviations above Sham 
participants. 
Individual-difference Factors. For each individual-difference factor, standard multiple 
regressions were performed between training slope as the outcome variable and condition, the 
individual difference, and the interaction between condition and the difference as predictor 









Model Variable N B SE B β p Adj. R2 
  
      
Baseline  
Condition  1.41 0.34 0.76 .002 
0.17 Baseline WM 67 0.98 0.49 0.30 .07 
Cond x baseline  -1.07 0.53 -0.47 .04 
 
 
      
Motivation 
Condition  -1.63 0.68 0.81 <.001 
0.25 Motivation 67 -0.31 0.09 -0.64 .001 
Cond x mot  0.35 0.11 0.73 .002 
 
 
      
Gender 
Condition  0.45 0.16 0.78 .004 
0.15 Gender 67 0.25 0.21 0.44 .25 
Cond x gender  -0.04 0.27 -0.06 .90 
 
 
      
Site 
Condition  0.59 0.20 1.04 .004 
0.13 Training site  67 0.08 0.21 0.15 .69 
Cond x site  -0.27 0.27 -0.48 .31 
 
 
     
Table 5.1. Regression Results for Individual-difference measures. Dummy coding of the 
categorical variables condition, gender, and training site employed the following references, 
respectively: sham, female, UCI. Unstandardized coefficients (B) are not mean-centered while 
standardized coefficients inherently are, and should be interpreted accordingly. For example, in 
the motivation model, B suggests a Sham advantage of 1.63 in the training slope when motivation 






Baseline performance. The model containing condition, baseline n-back performance, 
and the interaction term between condition and baseline performance explained a significant 
amount of variance in the training slope, F(3,63) = 5.53, p =.002, R2=.21, R2 adjusted = .17. The 
partial effect of condition was significant (Beta = .76, t(66) = 3.30, p = .002) with larger slopes in 
the Active condition compared to Sham, holding baseline constant at the sample mean (i.e., 
baseline is mean-centered to zero). The partial effect of baseline, referenced to the Sham condition, 
suggests at the trend level that greater baseline performance is associated with larger slopes in the 
absence of tDCS (Beta = .30, t(66) = 1.83, p =.07). Importantly, the interaction term between 
condition and visual n-back performance at baseline was significant (Beta = -.47, t(66) = -2.06, p 
= .04), indicating that each standard deviation increase in baseline performance reduces the effect 
of condition by .47 standard deviations. A Bayesian follow-up analysis largely supported this result 
with BF10 = 17.07 for the model with the baseline measure, condition, and the interaction term, and with 
BF10 = 5.63 for the interaction term itself. This suggests that tDCS is most effective among low-




Figure 5.1. Plot of baseline regression results. Active participants with low baseline scores 
outperform sham participants with low baseline scores, but the tDCS advantage gradually 
disappears with increasing baseline ability. Individuals with high baseline ability all improve 
similarly on the training task, regardless of condition. 
 
 Motivation. The model containing condition, motivation, and the interaction term between 
condition and motivation also explained a significant amount of the variance in the training slope 
F(3,63) = 8.45, p < .001, with an R2 = .29, R2 adjusted = .25. The partial effect of condition, holding 
motivation constant at the mean, was significant (Beta = .81, t(66) = 3.78, p < .001), reiterating 
the superior performance of the Active condition. However, the partial effect of motivation 
referenced to the Sham condition was also significant (Beta = .-64, t(66) = -3.41, p = .001), as was 
the interaction term between condition and motivation (Beta = .73, t(66) = 3.15, p = .002), 



















higher motivation perform worse than participants with lower motivation (Figure 5.2). A Bayesian 
follow-up analysis supported this primary result with BF10 = 302.61 for the model with the motivation 




Figure 5.2. Plot of motivation regression results. Active participants all improve similarly 
irrespective of motivation, but sham participants show a paradoxical decrease in performance with 
increasing motivation. 
 
 Gender. The model containing condition, gender, and the interaction term between 
condition and gender explained a significant amount of the variance in the training slope F(3,63) 



















gender constant among women was significant (Beta = .78, t(66) = 2.73, p < .01), neither gender 
(Beta = .44, t(66) = 1.17, p = .25), nor the interaction term between condition and gender (Beta = 
-.06, t(66) = -.13, p = .90) was significant. However, a Bayesian follow-up analysis resulted in a 
BF10 = 9.26 for the model with the gender, condition, and the interaction term, and with BF10 = 
4.15 for the interaction term itself. Thus, there is likely value in continuing to examine the 
impact of gender in tDCS work. 
 Study Site. The model containing condition, site of training (i.e. UM or UCI), and the 
interaction term between condition and site also explained a significant amount of the variance in 
the slope F(3, 63) = 4.33, p = .008, with an R2 = .17, R2 adjusted = .13. Again, while condition 
was a significant predictor (Beta = 1.04, t(66) = 2.98, p = .004), neither training site (Beta = .15, 
t(66) = .40, p = .69), nor the interaction term between condition and training site (Beta = .48, 
t(66) = 1.02, p = .31) was significant. A Bayesian follow-up analysis generally supported this 
primary result with BF10 = 4.94 for the model with the gender, condition, and the interaction 
term, and with BF10 = 0.33 for the interaction term itself. 
Long-term Follow-up. An ANCOVA was conducted with condition as a factor, time 
between the intervention and the follow-up as a covariate, and gain on the training task from the 
first training session to the second follow-up as the dependent variable to evaluate whether an 
effect of condition remained at the second follow-up that took place, on average, 355 days 
following the conclusion of the intervention. Condition remained a significant factor for the second 
follow-up, F(1,23) = 12.43, p = .002, with Active participants continuing to outperform Sham 
participants (Figure 5.3), while, as in the first follow-up reported in Au et al. (2016), time between 






Figure 5.3. Follow-up performance. Follow-up 1 represents in n-back levels gain from the first 
session to the first follow-up for active and sham participants reported in Au et al. (2016); 
Follow-up 2 represents gain from the first session to the new second follow-up approximately 12 
months after the intervention 
 
Discussion 
 Here we present evidence that certain individual-difference factors do have a significant 
impact on the outcome of combined WM training and tDCS. The effect of baseline was 
particularly striking. We found a trend suggesting that Sham participants who started with higher 
baseline ability tended to improve more over the course of training. Though this finding did not 
reach traditional levels of statistical significance (p=.07), it is nevertheless consistent with 
previous literature suggesting cognitive training may be more helpful to those who already have 
strong cognitive abilities (Looi et al., 2016; Lövdén, Brehmer, Li, & Lindenberger, 2012). More 
importantly, however, the interaction between baseline ability and condition (Active/Sham) was 
significant (see Figure 5.1), suggesting that the effects of baseline ability affected Active and 
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Sham participants differently. Specifically, the advantage of tDCS seemed to increase 
proportionately with decreasing baseline ability, such that a participant who started off 1 
standard deviation below the mean in terms of visual WM ability before training ended up 
outperforming a comparable Sham participant by .46 standard deviations over the course of 
training. However, this tDCS advantage declines with increasing baseline ability, and confers 
little additional advantage to a participant who already performs high at baseline relative to a 
comparably high-performing peer in the Sham group.  Although it is unclear what may mediate 
this interaction between stimulation and low baseline performance, it may have to do with 
differences in brain state and baseline cortical excitability between high and low groups (c.f., 
Krause & Cohen Kadosh, 2014). For example, it is known that the effects of transcranial 
magnetic stimulation (TMS) are influenced by the baseline excitability of the targeted cortex 
(Pasley, Allen, & Freeman, 2009; Silvanto, Cattaneo, Battelli, & Pascual-Leone, 2008) and that 
lower or more suppressed levels of neural excitability can increase the facilitatory effect of TMS. 
That said, these findings should be tempered by the fact that these findings would likely not 
survive multiple comparison tests; even if a fairly liberal Bonferroni correction accounting for 
only the primary tests of the interaction term was used (thus requiring a p value below .0125), 
the baseline result would not remain significant, although the curious motivation result would 
still stand. 
 We note that this finding of selective tDCS-enhancement among low-baseline individuals 
is not unique in the literature. For example, a number of studies also suggest a selective tDCS 
benefit among low-baseline populations, both within the WM domain (Gozenman & Berryhill, 
2016; Heinen et al., 2016; Minichino et al., 2015; Tseng et al., 2012) as well as in other cognitive 
domains, such as attention and dual-tasking (London & Slagter, 2015; Reinhart et al., 2016; 
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Zhou et al., 2015). However, one critical difference between these studies and ours is that ours is 
a training study involving multiple sessions of stimulation in conjunction with task performance, 
rather than just a single session (but see also Looi et al., 2016). Consequently, these results 
demonstrate enhancements not only to overall WM performance, but more specifically, to the 
rate of learning (as measured by the slope of improvement) across sessions. This raises the 
possibility that the selective effects of stimulation on low-baseline participants may impact not 
only online performance, but also offline consolidation, an important distinction for the 
enhancement of long-term learning (Au, Karsten, Buschkuehl, & Jaeggi, in press). Though these 
offline effects were supported in our previous work by demonstrating especial tDCS benefits 
when training sessions were spaced apart by a weekend (Au et al., 2016), a possible interaction 
of baseline performance and weekend consolidation in the present work is difficult to 
demonstrate due to power issues. For the same reason, the influence of baseline ability on 
follow-up performance is similarly difficult to evaluate.  
 While self-reported motivation also had a significant impact on the outcome of training, 
the finding of a significant interaction between motivation and condition was somewhat 
puzzling. The nature of the interaction is such that motivation is inversely related to slope in the 
Sham group only. It is unclear why lower-motivated individuals outperformed higher-motivated 
individuals in the Sham condition, but one possibility is that lower motivation was also 
associated with other influential factors, such as higher baseline performance (it is possible that 
for individuals who performed very well already, the intervention was not as interesting, while 
those who were aware of pre-existing limitations were more eager to improve their cognitive 
abilities). In fact, there is a moderately strong inverse correlation between baseline and 
motivation within the Sham group (r=-.42), suggesting that some of the observed motivation 
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effect simply recapitulates the baseline effect. Nevertheless, we also note that both high and low 
motivated individuals within the Active group experienced similar improvement during the 
intervention, suggesting that for those individuals receiving stimulation, motivation was not a 
major factor that impacted performance. We also note that our motivation measure—a single 
question asked each day before training—may be less ideal than a more in-depth survey measure 
(and such a measure might be better equipped to explain the curious motivation results discussed 
here). Finally, neither gender, nor site of training, nor the interaction between those variables and 
condition, predicted the slope of training. Thus, these analyses provide evidence that some 
individual-difference factors, such as baseline WM performance, play a major role in the 
outcome of combined tDCS and cognitive training, while others do not. 
Within the context of the larger corpus of tDCS research, these findings have significant 
implications for both existing and future studies that combine cognitive training with stimulation. 
Given the extent to which these factors, including baseline performance in particular, influence 
the outcome of training, it is possible that these differences may explain why so many 
participants in any individual study do not benefit from stimulation. Furthermore, it may also 
explain some of the null findings and even some of the varied outcomes observed among 
successful studies. At the very least, these findings provide an impetus for examining baseline 
differences as a covariate of interest in training and stimulation studies. This also means that 
future studies must be adequately powered to account for these differences and allow for them to 
be examined.  
We also note the continued difference between the Active and Sham conditions 
approximately a year (on average) following the intervention, extending the medium-term 
follow-up findings established in Au et al. (2016). This suggests that applying tDCS with 
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cognitive training may not only result in more robust and rapid improvements on the training 
task, but also that the improved performance on the training task relative to the Sham group may 
remain stable, even up to a year after the intervention. Importantly, we note that this follow-up 
examined only training effects, rather than any improvements in transfer tasks. Future work will 
be needed to establish the extent that transfer gain may also persist at long-term follow-up.  
 We note that these results must be tempered by certain limitations in our dataset. The 
baseline measure included here is perhaps less ideal than having the participant complete a 
session of the training task prior to stimulation, which would give a “true baseline” that might be 
a better predictor of subsequent performance. Additionally, there was considerable attrition 
between the initial study and the second follow-up. Finally, although this study was fairly well-
powered for a tDCS and training intervention, even more participants would be needed to have 
better confidence about the individual-difference findings presented here. Furthermore, we 
acknowledge that this study is not powered well enough to examine more than one individual-
difference factor at a time, and the follow-up sample is too small to examine in the context of the 
individual-difference factors covered here. Thus it is important to note the preliminary nature of 
the present analyses. 
 Despite these limitations, the practical implications of the baseline finding are of 
particular interest, both for cognitive training studies as well as tDCS-augmented learning more 
generally. Within cognitive training research, some studies have suggested that it is necessary for 
participants to demonstrate improvement on the training task in order to achieve transfer gains 
(e.g., Jaeggi et al., 2011). TDCS may enable participants with lower starting performance to 
reach similar gains to their higher-performing peers, thus overriding individual differences in 
baseline ability, and allowing more to benefit from the intervention. In the context of learning 
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more generally, tDCS may offer a means of helping individuals who might be struggling on a 
particularly WM-demanding task, such as math, improve more quickly. Preliminary research, 
albeit with only two sessions, suggests that this may indeed be possible (Looi et al., 2016). 
Additionally, subsequent work should combine this line of investigation with fMRI or EEG; the 
combination of physiological or neuroimaging data may allow researchers to better understand 
how physical characteristics and anatomical differences may impact the flow of current 
generated by the stimulation device. Most importantly, these results reinforce the importance of 
considering individual-differences during the administration of tDCS and training—as well as 
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 The aim of this dissertation, from the most general perspective, has been to better 
understand why some cognitive training studies are successful and others are not. More 
specifically, I investigated one particular individual-difference factor, motivation, in three 
working memory training studies. Across these three studies, I found that motivational factors— 
including game-like engagement features, recruitment posters and compensation, and self-ratings 
of motivation prior to training—sometimes impact the outcome of training. However, this impact 
was inconsistent and often idiosyncratic. Inconsistent results, however, are extremely common in 
cognitive training research, and, as I will discuss in this conclusion, may be indicative of larger 
issues facing the field. 
Summary of Individual Studies 
 Study 1 explored whether game elements that are often considered motivational—such as 
scoring or leveling—improved the outcome of a brief training intervention. Contrary to our 
hypothesis, the versions of the game that contained the fewest motivational features actually led 
to the greatest training and near-transfer gains. Study 2 examined whether monetary 
compensation—a reward that would likely be defined as “extrinsic” motivation—led to reduced 
training or transfer performance versus training conducted with no external reward. In fact, the 
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compensation provided had no effect on the outcome of the study. Although there were some 
differences in baseline characteristics between the two training groups, both experienced 
significant (and roughly equivalent) gains versus an active control group. Finally, Study 3 
examined a number of individual-difference factors, including motivation, in the context of 
tDCS-augmented cognitive training. Interestingly, the individual-difference factors that seemed 
to impact the outcome of training for the group that received sham stimulation (baseline and 
motivation) had no impact on the performance of the stimulated condition. However, like Studies 
1 and 2, the relationship between motivation and performance was surprising (at least for the 
sham condition): those participants with lower motivation scores actually performed better at the 
training. It is worth noting, as well, that Studies 1 and 3 focused primarily at training 
performance, while Study 2 also focused on far transfer (Study 1 only included a near-transfer 
measure). While training performance and transfer are often closely connected, this is not always 
the case, and the possible interplay between motivation, training, and transfer together is likely 
worthy of future investigation. 
 Our hypotheses were not fully supported, to some extent, in each of the three studies. 
What can be made of these unexpected results? It remains possible that some other factor that 
was not measured is at play; it is also possible, as with most cognitive training studies, that low-
power led to these surprising results. It is also possible, however, that motivation is a complex 
construct and that its impact on the outcome of extended interventions may often be more 
nuanced than expected. For example, in Study 1, it is possible that “motivational elements” such 
as those included in games might actually be beneficial over the long term, even if they are 
apparently harmful to early learning of a task. In Study 2, it remains possible that compensation 
could have an undermining effect on motivation and performance in certain situations. However, 
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the manipulation check used in the paid group provides some preliminary evidence that the 
motivational orientation of our participants defies “intrinsic” versus “extrinsic” divisions. Many 
participants reported being self-motivated to participate, despite seeing no self-improvement 
language. This was an unexpected result. Finally, in Study 3, stimulation did have the effect of 
seemingly minimizing the effects of the examined individual differences on the outcome of the 
training. That said, how can we explain the relationship between motivation and training 
performance in the sham group? Why would more highly-motivated participants perform worse? 
One possible answer to this question is that a single motivation question is not adequate to fully 
explore the impact of motivation on the outcome of training. This would certainly come as no 
surprise to motivation researchers. In aggregate, the present findings tell us more about cognitive 
training (or tDCS) more generally than motivation in particular. Study 1 and Study 2 provide 
modest support for the existence of near transfer following a training intervention; while Study 3 
suggests that tDCS may reduce the impact of certain individual difference factors on training 
performance. Without larger sample sizes, longer training regimens, and a better understanding 
of how individuals who dropped out would respond if they had completed the training, it is 
difficult to draw strong, or even modest, conclusions about how the motivational factors of 
interest would impact individuals in a real-world intervention. In hindsight, it is easy to identify 
these limitations; it is worth noting that some of them were considered even before running these 
studies. These examples demonstrate how challenging running laboratory-based cognitive 
training studies can be. Thus, while we have arguably provided some preliminary evidence that 
motivation may play a nuanced role in the outcome of cognitive training, it is also clear that this 
relationship may require considerable research. Of course, this is a common refrain at the 
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conclusion of dissertations, but perhaps there are other lessons that can be learned from this line 
of work. 
 
The Problem with Binary Questions 
 It is likely accurate to state that the question most-often asked of cognitive training 
researchers is whether cognitive training “works.” Perhaps this is the wrong question to ask. 
Alan Newell, in his classic piece that inspired our title (Newell, 1973), points out that 
psychological science operates on two levels: one in which there are incremental, specific studies 
that elaborate on a phenomenon (e.g., does cognitive training work better when practice is 
spaced or massed) and one that asks fairly large binary questions (e.g., nature vs. nurture). But 
what is missed is a more unified approach that allows us to better understand “the behavior of 
man” (p. 6). Newell offers one highly relevant strategy to achieve this: to center experimental 
and theoretical work around “a single complex task,” and in the service of this develop a 
coherent theoretical model supported by many smaller studies (e.g., Meyer & Kieras, 1997). If 
cognitive training researchers were to take up his recommendations, they would need to develop 
computational process models of prefrontal function and intelligent behavior.  Hypotheses about 
how the model improved on the training task and how that would generalize to a transfer task 
could then be tested via the model. Empirical studies would support model development via 
micro-studies that help generate parameters, and also studies that test the model’s predictions. In 
particular, empirical studies should test possible underlying mechanisms that support transfer. As 
the Buffalo Springfield lyric goes, “there’s something happening here, but what it is ain’t exactly 
clear.” In cognitive training we have identified what appears to be a compelling phenomenon, 
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but without an overarching theoretical framework to guide empirical research, progress in 
understanding this phenomenon will likely be stalled.  
 Given this, one reasonable question is what the ideal “motivation in cognitive training” 
study might look like. Could one design a study (or, perhaps, a set of studies) to better answer 
the sort of questions addressed earlier? For example, let’s say we were specifically interested in 
verifying whether game-like elements played a role in the outcome of training, in addition to 
whether recruitment materials and compensation impacted outcomes, and finally, whether 
motivational orientation throughout the intervention impacted the outcome of training.  This 
might seem like too many questions to address in a single experiment, but in fact, this sort of 
complexity is addressed through A/B testing within large internet corporations on a daily basis. 
Ideally, one would include both control (likely a trivia-based task) and experimental task 
versions of the game all the game-like features included, none of them, or a single feature 
removed. So instead of seven, fourteen groups would be required. Furthermore, each of these 
groups would also be recruited through either an advertisement that emphasized improving 
intelligence or an advertisement that emphasized simply completing some tasks for 
compensation, giving us twenty-eight groups total. Additionally, each of these groups would 
then be divided again, to determine whether the use of compensation impacted training and 
transfer. For the purposes of this “ideal study” we can also assume that five covariates might be 
included in the analysis (including, of course, full motivation surveys rather than single question, 
such as Need for Cognition, the Intrinsic Motivation Questionnaire, etc.). A power analysis with 
G*Power, with these fifty-six groups and five covariates, and with a small effect size of .1 
(similar to what was found in the studies in this dissertation) requires a fairly large number of 
participants: 2448. While this may seem like a daunting sample size, it is trivial compared to the 
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number of participants who complete online cognitive training each day through commercial 
brain training companies, and at least one study recruited far more participants using the internet 
(Owen et al., 2010). In this case, internet recruitment and online administration would be used as 
well, with different online ads used to target the “intrinsic” versus “extrinsic” participants. 
 Participants would complete a full twenty-sessions of training online and would also 
complete a large battery of pre- and post-tests as in Study 2 (and these tests could likely be 
reduced to a smaller number of latent or composite variables). Naturally, some participants 
would drop-out at different points of the study, and one would use the pre-test measures 
collected to determine what, if any differences existed between the drop-out and completed 
participants (although another, separate study would likely be used to fully explore the drop-out 
issue). At the end of the study, a researcher would then be able to examine not only the main 
effects of these different factors, but also interactions between them, looking not only at training 
performance but also transfer. Multiple comparisons would be an issue, but remember that even 
this large study would only be the first of several in the pursuit of developing a coherent model 
of motivation in cognitive training. Groups could be adjusted and new comparisons added based 
on the outcome of the study – for example, if removing score positively impacted performance 
but nothing else had this effect, the following study would simply include a version of training 
without score included during play, and a new comparison could be examined.  
 
Implications for the Field 
As discussed earlier, there are often practical limits on conducting high quality studies of 
cognitive training. While it is valuable to work towards developing better studies of cognitive 
training, there remain other conflicts of interest and motivational factors that influence which 
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studies are conducted and ultimately published (90).  In general, the studies that are most likely 
to appear in the press or high-impact journals are those that have novel, unexpected, and clearly 
impactful results.  Studies with null effects, or those that replicate and incrementally test the 
boundary conditions of a finding, are perceived as much less valuable. Additionally, scientists 
are not immune to the idea of “motivated reasoning.” If they have strong beliefs or motivations 
inconsistent with the results of the study, they are easily able to find flaws (see the classic study 
by Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979).  But when they wish to believe a finding, the flaws are less 
visible.  
 If there were no multi-million-dollar cognitive training industry, the field would be much 
less controversial. And yet, this is the world we live in. So what do we tell parents who want to 
know whether these programs can help their children? We know that proper nutrition (Glewwe, 
Jacoby, & King, 2001), sleep (Curcio, Gerrara, & De Gennaro, 2006), and physical exercise 
(Tomporowski et al., 2007) are beneficial for cognitive development, and such factors need to be 
addressed whether or not children engage in cognitive training. However, it is clear that there is 
little to be lost, and possibly much to be gained, through engaging in cognitively enriching 
activities (e.g. cognitive training but also music, dance, meditation, board games, etc.). At the 
same time, we hope that consumers will be on guard against strong promises offered by 
purveyors of cognitive training programs. Consider the continuing allure of “brain-based” 
marketing techniques. While recent work has provided experimental evidence for these strategies 
as tools of persuasion (Weisberg et al, 2008; Rhodes, Rodriguez, & Shah, 2014), their dangerous 
efficacy has been clear since the days of Pelmanism over a century ago. When neuroscience is 
evoked, non-experts are more likely to believe explanations—even if those explanations are 
otherwise unsound.  
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If one thing is certain, it is that the public interest in improving cognition will continue 
for the foreseeable future. But the outcome of any individual study, of any individual 
intervention, and, as we have illustrated, any individual meta-analysis cannot be construed as a 
conclusive answer to the question of how much cognitive function might be improved through 
intervention. In addition to the theoretical and modeling work discussed above, we note that 
significant attention should be given to the careful communication of findings. Often the fault on 
this count lies not in conducting studies that have methodological limitations and potential 
alternative interpretations, as these studies might guide us towards better future work and a richer 
understanding of the phenomenon.  Rather, the fault lies in interpreting the results of these 
limited studies as “proof” that cognitive training does or does not work. When studies are 
published in short-form journals or reported in press releases, claims tend to be exaggerated and 
the limitations receive short shrift. One study in the British Medical Journal recently analyzed 
462 health science press releases and found that 40% of them overstate the implications of the 
findings (Sumner et al., 2014). Unfortunately, even when “hedging” language is present in 
scientific articles, most readers gloss over the details and focus on the main claim when reading 
about scientific studies (Norris, Phillips, & Korpan, 2003).  
That the issues discussed in Chapter 1 remain in spite of the actual empirical work 
conducted, and possibly because of it as well, especially when researchers improperly generalize 
or ignore previous findings. And they were not solved despite decades of theoretical and 
methodological discussions that in many respects were not dissimilar from more recent reviews, 
such as Simons et al. (Simons et al., 2016). Thus the issue of whether cognitive training “works” 
was not settled in 1910, nor 1914, nor in all the years that followed. As Mead wrote in 1946: “A 
final question is this: how long will it take for the facts known about transfer to be used, and 
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adjustments to be made accordingly? One hundred years? Or never?” (Mead, 1946). We still do 
not have definitive answers to this question.  Researchers may not have the answer 100 years 
hence. But if we keep asking, simply, “does cognitive training work,” rather than investigating 
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